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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Adam J. Hodges for the Master of Arts in History 
presented July 9, 1996. 
Title: The Industrial Workers of the World and the Oregon Packing Company 
Strike of July 1913 
This study builds upon the notion of a Wobbly 'sensibility' established 
by Salvatore Salemo and relates it to John Townsend's analysis of conflict 
between that group's adherents and western Progressives. The latter scholar, 
by concentrating on middle-class economic anxiety, failed to deal with the 
virtual unanimity of opposition to the IWW in western towns. Salerno's 
assertion that a 'sensibility' within the IWW was more binding than ideology 
raises the possibility that individuals and organizations of varying beliefs could 
be similarly united within a single cultural sphere with a directed purpose. 
Such an analysis can apply to factions of Progressivism and radical labor alike. 
The first chapter begins with a brief account of the historical context, 
origins, and organizational history of the IWW. This second section discusses 
the internal dynamic of the IWW, particularly the relationship between the 
leadership and rank-and-file. The third section briefly explicates the purpose of 
the thesis. The second chapter recounts important episodes of IWW activity 
that occurred on the West Coast concurrently with the strike in order to set the 
regional context of the conflict. 
The third chapter begins with a section discussing the development of 
Progressivism and urbanization in a national context and emphasizes cultural 
conflict. The second section is a brief survey of Progressive era Portland, 
Oregon. The third and fourth sections discuss the cultural repercussions of 
women entering industrial life on a mass scale. The chapter concludes with a 
brief demographic survey of cannery women. 
The fourth chapter is a chronological narrative of the strike, and is 
followed by a concluding fifth chapter of analysis. The first section suggests a 
Progressive 'sensibility' arrayed specifically against radical labor, while the next 
section discusses a radical 'sensibility' hostile to varying aspects of the cultural 
norms of Progressivism. The final section asserts the importance of analysis of 
cultural values, above even notions of class, in addition to economic analysis in 
order to obtain a more useful synthesis of Wobbly conflict than now exists. 
THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD AND 
THE OREGON PACKING COMP ANY STRIKE 
OF JULY 1913 
by 
ADAM J. HODGES 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
in 
HISTORY 
Portland State University 
1996 
Preface 
The Oregon Packing Company, a fruit cannery located near the 
industrialized riverfront of Portland, Oregon's working-class East Side, battled 
a walkout by a significant number of its predominantly female workforce 
during the peak of the canning season in 1913. The strike holds little 
significance for students of institutional labor history, for it was unsuccessful 
both in achieving its demands and unionizing the protestors. In fact, the wane 
of the season prevented these women from even returning to the jobs they had 
fought to improve. Why, then, is the strike worthy of close study? 
The action can serve as a rich tapestry displaying the cultural 
transformation that emerged from the dramatic shifts in industrial relations 
during the Progressive era. Many such strikes have been overlooked because 
labor historians have so often placed economic analysis above cultural. Perhaps 
because the strike was doomed to failure, conducted within a seasonal industry 
and outside of accepted norms of labor relations, the vigorous nature of the 
protest is so noteworthy. Before the strike itself is chronicled in the fourth 
chapter, a good deal of contextual understanding will be required in order to 
read fully into its signifcance and to understand the concluding chapter that 
follows. At issue is the nature of the cultural cohesiveness within both the strike 
coalition and the Progressivist consensus that represented community 
opposition to the methods of the protest. Therein lies much of the substance of 
the tensions between the two. 
The IWW quickly became the focus of public attention during the 
conflict although they were merely one segment of a coalition. To complicate 
matters, scholarly work on the Wobblies has quite often reinforced such 
simplistic notions. In order to rectify these distorted perceptions, a thorough 
examination of the historical context and historiography of the Wobblies will 
serve as the focus of the first chapter. Special attention will be paid to the 
internal dynamic of the IWW in order to clarify the roles of culture and 
ideology within the union. The second chapter recounts four incidents on the 
West Coast during the summer of 1913 in which the IWW participated. This 
section will serve to contextualize the Portland conflict and raise some of the 
major issues concerning the union's participation in economic actions. 
Although it will become clear that the IWW was both internally divided 
and capable of participating in coalitions, Progressives viewed the union as 
monolithic. The shrill public outrage against the Wobblies, goaded by a 
relentlessly antagonistic local press, demands an understanding of the context 
and development of Progressivism both nationally and in Portland. Particular 
attention is reserved in this third chapter for the intersection of economic and 
cultural tensions within Progressivism. Confusion over the appropriate place 
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The fifty women who marched out of the Oregon Packing Company 
on the morning of June 27, 1913 to protest low wages were part of a dramatic 
economic shift that transformed virtually every aspect of American social 
and cultural life in less than half a century. Although the U.S. population 
increased at the dramatic rate of 132% between 1870 and 1910, the number of 
laborers moving into industrial jobs quadrupled. Alan Trachtenberg has 
noted that "wage labor emerged, unequivocally, as the definitive working 
class experience," with the industrial work force claiming more than a third 
of the nation's population by 1900. As the economy was transformed by 
incorporation and industrial growth, workers sought to further their 
collective interests.1 
The Knights of Labor was the first significant attempt by 'producers' 
(which, at this point, included small businessmen) to prevent the 
permanency of the wage system. Established in 1869 by a tailor, the Knights 
thrived in the 1870s and 1880s, before massive levels of immigration and 
economic growth erased the possibility of establishing a cooperative 
commonwealth built on traditional American ideals. In the 1890s, a 
substantial portion of the Knights lost interest in the seemingly hopeless 
ideal of transforming the economy and began to expound a pragmatic 
philosophy based on acceptance of corporate capitalism and an emphasis on 
immediate gains for workers. This constituency, composed mainly of native 
white males who worked in skilled crafts, filtered into the American 
1 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and 
American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 54; Alan 
Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture & Society in the Gilded Age (New 
York: Hill & Wang, 1982) 87. 
Federation of Labor (AFL) and left the Knights in terminal decline. The 
rapid growth of AFL membership after its inception in 1886 and the 
disappearance of the Knights dramatically increased the exclusivity of labor 
organization. The Knights had been fairly open to all races, ethnicities, 
laboring occupations, and both genders. The AFL, however, served a small 
homogeneous group of elite craft workers. Yet, the dramatic growth of 
unskilled industrial occupations, and the mass entry of immigrants and 
women into those jobs, left the vast majority of workers unrepresented in an 
economy that was leaving them increasingly impoverished. In the late 1880s, 
45% of industrial workers hovered just above the poverty line while 40°/c> 
were below that level.2 
2 
To a substantial number of these excluded individuals, the concept of 
syndicalism held out hope for a collectivist society governed by workers. 
Syndicalists intended that after mass organization workers would elect 
councils, by industry, that would coordinate the government and economy. 
The idea was radical and transformative, differing from the reform of the 
Knights in that it looked to a completely new culture based on 
working-class collectivism rather than one of Jeffersonian independent 
producer values. Syndicalism was not American, it was becoming 
international and had its roots in radical western European socialist 
philosophy. It also differed hugely with the approach of the pragmatic AFL, 
for syndicalism was openly antagonistic to compromise approaches with 
capitalism and refuted the validity of contracts made within the wage 
2Trachtenberg, 94-96, 90. 
3 
system. Syndicalists espoused the active ruination of the economy through 
sabotage on the job, civil disobedience, and eventually, when the bodies to 
take over the state and economy were in place, a general strike of all workers 
to topple the current regime. The first mass expression of this radical 
philosophy in the United States was the Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW), formed in 1905.3 
The IWW was inspired by the precedent of two recently created labor 
organizations: the American Railway Union (ARU) and the Western 
Federation of Miners (WFM), both founded in 1893. The ARU and WFM 
were based upon the principle that unions should be organized along 
industrial, rather than craft, lines. This approach allowed the organization of 
those excluded from skilled crafts on a significant scale for the first time, and 
prevented the division of workers within industries into craft fiefdoms, 
which weakened solidarity. The WFM had already made two previous 
attempts to form a multi-industry union, with the Western Labor Union 
(WLU) and the American Labor Union (ALU). To prevent yet another 
failure, the WFM began seeking the cooperation of like-minded individuals 
and organizations to form a broad-based, radical alternative to the AFL.4 
The IWW was the fruit of this outreach, drawing in (among others) 
Daniel De Leon of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP) and Eugene Debs, leader 
3Discussion of syndicalism from Salvatore Salerno, Red November, Black 
November: Culture and Community in the Industrial Workers of the World (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1989). 
4Discussion of origins and organizational history of IWW from Melvyn Dubofsky, 
We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1988). 
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of the Socialist Party and founder of the A.RU. Meeting in Chicago, its 
founding convention brought together an eclectic group of union organizers 
and radical politicos who formulated the blueprint for a working-class 
utopia. Yet, strong tensions between proponents of political and economic 
action resulted in the repudiation of socialist political activity as a means to 
achieving a syndicalist state. The wrangling that led to this decision resulted 
in the departure of the WFM, whose leaders quickly despaired of the new 
organization. The remaining Wobbly leadership insisted on the plausibility 
of supplanting the state with an industrial democracy in which all power 
would be derived from workers and expressed through their delegates. 
Economic, not political, agitation and organization would be the means of 
achieving a new working-class regime through a syndicalist state.s 
Although the IWW was opposed nationally by the A.FL, its most 
powerful opponents prior to World War I were regional. Provincial 
newspapers, commercial associations, and politicians railed against the 
radical philosophy and methods of the Wobblies wherever they became 
active. Clearly the national government did not find the Wobblies a threat to 
American institutions, for constant pleas for federal intervention fell upon 
deaf ears. During the War, however, the IWW aroused the wrath of the state 
by threatening production levels in two key industries: timber and mining. 
Open opposition to the war and fermentation of labor unrest instigated a 
Bureau of Investigation sweep of IWW offices in 1918-19, and trials for 
hundreds of leaders. In the Pacific Northwest timber industry, the Army 
Sfuid. 
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actually took over operations and formed a new, compulsory union. 
Having lost most of their assets and leadership, the Wobblies were crushed 
organizationally and never reemerged in the postwar period. Despite its 
inability to survive World War I and the 'red scare' of 1919-20, the IWW left a 
strong legacy of labor insurgence.fl 
During their most active decade (1908-18), Wobblies led dramatic and 
highly publicized industrial strikes in the Northeast; the Paterson, New 
Jersey and Lawrence, Massachusetts textile walkouts were the most notable. 
Yet, the union's greatest success came in organizing itinerant agricultural 
and extractive workers in the Middle and Far West. The IWW became a 
portable home for homeless western laborers, a cultural fellowship and a 
means to redress grievances that focused on forests, fields, and mines to 
which the mass media and middle-class reformers would never venture. 
Strongly imbued with the gruff and iconoclastic sensibility of the WFM, the 
union would come to mold itself both organizationally and culturally to 
this western hobo contingent.7 
Many aspects of the IWW remain unclear, however, due to dissension 
among its chroniclers over the course of the century. Early accounts of the 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid. 
union evoked the image of a demon. John Graham Brooks condemned the 
movement in a 1913 study that criticized the perceived drift of European 
and American socialism into the rascality of syndicalism. Brooks viewed 
syndicalists as irreverent upstarts, and an insult to well-behaved traditional 
socialists. He ridiculed the Wobbly tactic of organizing "the man in the 
gutter," and "working children and the blacks." Given this constituency, he 
claimed, the notion of all wealth originating in labor was "so exhaustively 
silly" and "so childish as to excite suspicion of its motive." Yet, Brooks 
6 
believed that the "used and ignorant masses should also have their own 
representatives. All attempts to prevent this are now too late." His solution 
focused on eliciting more gentlemanly behavior from capitalists and 
granting (as vaguely as possible) "genuine representation in ... management" 
to workers, stressing that ignoring the laboring masses and public opinion 
would have serious consequences. Moderate and trustworthy individuals 
were to cease sitting on the sidelines and negotiate solutions to labor-
management tensions that would steal the IWW's thunder.8 
In contrast to Brooks, a handful of more liberal intellectuals such as 
Paul Brissenden were excited about the new ideas expounded by the 
Wobblies although they eschewed its radical methods. Brissenden 
published a study of the Wobblies in 1919, in which he asserted that "the 
most important item in the affirmative part of the I.W.W. program" was the 
"demand that some of our democracy ... be extended from political into 
8John Graham Brooks, American Syndicalism: The I.W.W. (New York: Macmillan, 
1913) 73-75, 82, 241. 
economic life." Brissenden saw little difference between the ultimate goal of 
liberal Progressivism and IWW ideology. He suggested that "the Wobblies 
would have 'capitalism' ... supplanted by economic democracy just as 
political despotism has been supplanted by political democracy in nearly 
all civilized states." Writing during World War I, when the globalization of 
liberal Progressivism still seemed plausible, Brissenden was prescient of the 
economic democratization that would begin in earnest with the New Deal. 
However, although the goals of the IWW impressed him, the organization 
itself did not. He suggested that "even though capitalism may be ripe for 
replacement, the I.W.W. are a long way from being fit to replace it. The 
Wobblies are grotesquely unprepared for responsibility." Brissenden 
eschewed IWW advocacy of sabotage, demands for complete control of 
industry, and neglect of consumer welfare. As a liberal economist and 
Progressive, Brissenden found the syndicalism of the Wobblies to be both 
irresponsible and as autocratic as the system it sought to replace.9 
The collapse of the Wobblies, already complete by the time 
Brissenden's study appeared, caused interest in the union to erode 
significantly until the social history movement and a growing contingent of 
sympathetic historians of the left emerged in the 1960s. The first major study 
of the IWW in this period, that of Philip Foner, an avowed Marxist-Leninist, 
appeared in 1965. For Foner, syndicalism was not the type of reckless 
socialism that it had been for Brooks and Brissenden. Referring to previous 
9Paul F. Brissenden, The I.W.W.: A Study of American Syndicalism (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1957) xix-xxi. 
7 
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studies of the union, Foner claimed that "no one would realize from these 
accounts that the I.W.W. made valuable contributions in the campaign to 
organize the unorganized." He framed the Wobblies as both bold, 
displaying "heroic militancy," and irresponsible, falling prey to "serious 
flaws in its ideology" that would have, in any case, prevented eventual 
triumph. Following on the heels of Joyce Kornbluh's 1964 anthology of IWW 
primary sources, Foner's account helped define the Wobblies as 
misunderstood heroes, culpable only for their lack of coherent ideology. He 
lamented their destruction by "an alliance of big business and government" 
that simply used World War I as an excuse to vanquish the union. Those that 
clashed with the IWW were part of a systemic defense of capitalism lashing 
out at a dangerous foe.10 
Melvyn Dubofsky's survey of the Wobblies, the most thorough yet 
written, appeared in 1969. Although more restrained than Foner in his praise 
for IWW heroism, Dubofsky concluded the volume with regrets that the role 
of labor radicals in the modern western world had been only to serve as 
midwives of the welfare state. Like Foner, Dubofsky assumed that the 
Wobblies presented a viable threat to the smooth functioning of the 
American economy and forced compromise from frightened capitalists. 
"Employers who were threatened by the IWW paid greater attention to labor 
relations," he asserted. Yet, Dubofsky's own meticulous research belied such 
statements. In order to elevate the Wobblies to heroic status, however 
lOPhilip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Volume IV: 
The Industrial Workers of the World, 1905-1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1965) 9, 
558; Joyce L. Kornbluh, ed., Rebel Voices: An I.W.W. Anthology (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1964); Foner, 558. 
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flawed, historians had to portray the union as potent.11 
The myth of Wobbly effectiveness had been savaged by Robert Tyler 
in 1967 in his account of IWW activity in the Pacific Northwest. Yet, his work 
failed to significantly influence contemporary scholarship, evinced by the 
continuity between Foner and Dubofsky. Tyler saw IWW agitation as 
frequently violent, yet pointless. Its success in the region sprang from forces 
of rapid upheaval, both economic and demographic. He found in the 
Wobblies a pioneer spirit: individualist, rugged, and nonconformist. This 
perspective received little notice from more doctrinaire contemporaries, for 
it would have placed the IWW within a regional tradition, rather than a new 
and radical mold. In addition, Tyler's skepticism concerning the Wobblies 
was too extreme, his disdain for their 'free speech fights' too strong, to shift 
the course of IWW historiography singlehandedly.12 
Joseph Conlin's brief 1969 study set about to correct some common 
myths concerning the Wobblies. Yet in doing so, he overemphasized their 
normality. Conlin maintained that the 'free speech fights' were solely 
oriented towards organization, and that the IWW had faith in the court 
system and were adept at compromise with municipal authorities. 
Although a valuable restraint upon further romanticization by subsequent 
historians, Conlin's study mistakenly removed the IWW's uniqueness: he 
failed to deal with the Wobblies as a significant and nontraditional social 
11Dubofsky, 483-484. 
12Robert L. Tyler, Rebels of the Woods: The l.W.W. in the Pacific Northwest 
(Eugene: University of Oregon Books, 1967) Chapter 1. 
movement and cultural community.13 
Despite challenges from Tyler and Conlin, the work of Foner and 
Dubofsky seems to have led many recent scholars to focus on systemic 
interpretations of the brutalities that IWW members suffered. In a 1986 
journal article, Dennis Hoffman and Vincent Webb employed a narrowly 
Marxist thesis in order to explicate police responses to the Wobblies in 
10 
Portland and Seattle. Their analysis can be broken down into three areas: 
local political uses of police, the criminalization of the surplus labor force, 
and the buttressing of the existing social order. The authors asserted that 
during the economic crisis of 1913-14, "the authorities in Seattle and 
Portland 'criminalized' the surplus labor force by charging the unemployed 
with vagrancy and treating them as though they were real criminals." They 
traced such repression to the fact that overproduction in the lumber 
industry had created a large pool of men who were trained to cut lumber 
and drifted in and out of work. This situation was ideal for lumber 
company owners, who could easily find trained workers when they were 
needed and could pay them paltry wages because the demand for work was 
so high. Hoffman and Webb went on to assert that although this brand of 
economy cost the cities in the short run due to welfare dole payments, in the 
long run, they received "higher tax revenues" and "easier access to loans" 
from increasing wealth in the logging industry. Portraying the two cities as 
microcosms of a larger two-class systemic struggle, Hoffman and Webb 
13Joseph Robert Conlin, Bread and Roses Too: Studies of the Wobblies (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1969) 74-76. 
assume that "the 'Wobblies' ... presented a militant threat to industrial 
capi talism."14 
John Townsend's dissertation on the cultural sources of anti-Wobbly 
violence, published in the same year as Hoffman and Webb's article, 
provided a much needed counterweight to the rigid ideological analysis 
often associated with scholarship on the Wobblies. Townsend argued that 
the western battles between I.WW activists and municipal authorities were 
11 
products of the growing marginalization of both social groups. As business 
activity became nationally centralized in large corporations, the AFL grew 
also, creating the beginnings of what would later become a societal balance 
between two powerful conflicting bureaucracies. The individuals who 
were being squeezed out by this process were radical labor leaders, laborers 
in unmechanized industries, and small business interests. In the West, the 
first group attempted to organize the second, and both met strong resistance 
from the third. Townsend asserted that "although Progressive reforms 
attempted to curb disorder, many citizens were apprehensive." The source 
of their anxiety was the emerging shift of power to far-removed corporate 
and labor bureaucracies. He found that the local businesspeople who 
encouraged brutal anti-I.WW vigilantism were Progressives, and "these 
activities were not incompatible." Wobblies themselves were also 
struggling against an increasingly marginal role. Townsend suggested that 
"they were basically outsiders, excluded from the emerging forums that 
14Dennis E. Hoffman and Vincent J. Webb, "Police Response to Labor Radicalism in 
Portland and Seattle" Oregon Historical Quarterly 87 (Winter 1986) 356-357. 
12 
began to regulate labor conflict."15 
The historiography of the fWW indicates that scholars have had 
difficulty interpreting the relationship between the revolutionary rhetoric of 
the organization and the character and behavior of its transient rank-and-file. 
Contemporary accounts found the leadership to be irresponsibly radical 
and its following to be empty vessels for outrageous ideas concerning the 
societal debt to labor. Brooks and Brissenden both focused on an 
irresponsible leadership goading simple laborers toward self-destructive 
(and societally abhorrent) behavior. Their work would not be significantly 
challenged until a new generation of social historians in the 1960s prompted 
a reevaluation of the relationship between leaders and led. 
Philip Foner played a major role in this reevaluation, finding a 
commonality of leadership ignored by previous historians. The Wobbly 
principle that official leaders were servants of their members, and all 
workers should lead, precipitated a lack of respect for the union's officials 
and a great deal of accompanying mistrust and dissension. Individual 
leaders suffered constant antagonism. Foner cited the case of Fred 
Heslewood, lambasted for owning his own home. The leadership as a whole 
15John Clendenin Townsend, Running the Gauntlet: Cultural Sources of Violence 
Against the I.WW (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986) 203-206. 
also received constant threats to its authority. "Almost every single issue of 
the Industrial Worker," Foner wrote, "contained at least one article or 
resolution demanding decentralization of the national administration." In 
keeping with the ideals of the social history movement and with Foner's 
Marxism, the rank-and-file was framed as politicized and empowered. 
Although Foner's evidence evoked a vivid picture of struggle within the 
ranks, his Marxist tenets did not allow him to reach the conclusions his 
research suggested. "The Wobblies shelved their disagreements over 
leadership," he stated, "and presented a united front to the class enemy." 
Foner projected the alienation of IVVW leaders from existing social and 
institutional norms upon the rank-and-file, and assumed a strong 
philosophical connection between 'leaders' and 'followers.'16 
13 
Building upon Foner's idealistic and ideologically motivated study, 
Dubofsky asserted that the union's confrontations "were instigated 
primarily to overcome resistance to IVVW organizing tactics and also to 
demonstrate that America's dispossessed could, through direct action, 
challenge established authority." Yet, Conlin's work seemed to have offered 
a more complex picture of IVVW activity. Because organizers could not 
recruit on the job (which would have necessitated penetrating countless 
miles of forest and farmland), they operated in the towns where transient 
workers came to weather the off-season. Soap box speaking was a valuable 
device for attracting attention to the Wobblies from itinerant workers. But 




involvement in the 'free speech fights' seems to have been triggered by pent-
up anger over living and working conditions rather than the loss of civil 
liberties. To agree with Dubofsky's assumption that "the IWW and its 
members did challenge the law and endure violence and imprisonment to 
win free speech" requires a leap of faith that there indeed was a politically 
motivated and shared agenda among the transient workers of the brutal 
western wilderness who came and went with the seasons.17 
Like Foner, Dubofsky seemed to suggest that the motives shared by 
the leadership of the IWW could be ascribed to the rank-and-file. His 
description of the factors driving union membership appeared highly 
idealistic and generalized, and perhaps offered more insight into the 
composition of the leadership than of their followers: 
Feeling impotent and alienated, these men harbored deep grievances 
against the essential institutions of the ruling classes: police, 
government and church. Hence, Wobblies ... exhibited a high 
susceptibility to unrest and to radical movements aimed at 
destroying the established social order. 
Wobblies tended to live a life that was quite isolated from societal 
institutions and almost certainly did not have the understanding of them 
that their more urban and industrial counterparts did. Socialist blueprints 
for a new society would have been of interest to a minority of the 
membership who were familiar with literature on the subject, but this 
minority was surely insubstantial in the forests, fields, and mining camps of 
the West.18 
17Dubofsky, 173-175. 
18Dubofsky, 150; Tyler, 26. 
15 
However, the IWW leadership did have a great deal of shared 
experience with its constituency. After the last of the socialist politicos had 
been purged at the 1908 national convention, the remainder was composed 
partially of dedicated industrial unionists who had themselves been 
laborers (often migrants in western mining or agriculture) and European 
immigrants well-versed in socialist scholarship and French syndicalism. The 
latter group intended to use the IWW to organize the millions of immigrants 
caught up in industrialization and exerted a powerful influence on 
propaganda. However, the native western faction of the leadership was 
much more successful in recruitment. Although it was being pulled in two 
directions, toward both the western wilderness and the eastern cities, the 
IWW's membership demographics indicate that it was indeed a western 
non-industrially oriented organization. However, because it contained 
leaders attracted to a variety of constituencies, it had the appearance of a 
national organization in both its organizing activity and propaganda.19 
Both elements of the leadership went through a personal evolution 
that led to revolutionary socialism, but under different circumstances. It 
was this disparity of experience that led them to agree on theory but 
disagree on direction. William Haywood and William Trautmann, both of 
whom served as Secretary-Treasurer of the IWW, were quite representative 
of the western and eastern leadership factions respectively. Haywood was a 
Utah born hard-rock miner, who after twelve years experience became a 
WFM official in Idaho and then a Socialist Party activist. He was self-taught, 
19Characteristics of leadership and demographics of rank-and-file from Dubofsky. 
16 
of rough-hewn intellect, and was primarily an organizer and administrator, 
not a theorist. William Trautmann was an immigrant with experience in the 
socialist labor movements of Russia and Germany, who worked as an 
organizer and editor for the Brewery Workers Union in Massachusetts. He 
helped found the IWW, which made him its first Secretary-Treasurer, and 
was remembered as an inept administrator but an active theorist and 
agitator .20 
Both men obtained their hatred of 'bourgeois' institutions through 
socialist political involvement and union organizing experience. However, 
their goals were markedly different. Trautmann hoped to organize steel and 
textiles in the Northeast, while Haywood looked to lumber and mining in 
the West. Although an active political socialist, Haywood remained 
suspicious of intellectuals and certainly represented the rank-and-file more 
closely than did Trautmann. Dubofsky's assertions regarding IWW 
alienation certainly apply to both Haywood and Trautmann. However, the 
two men developed their antagonism to 'bourgeois' institutions through 
sophisticated political activity. Dubofsky submitted that after the IWW was 
effectively crushed by the Justice Department in 1918, it became "a radical 
fellowship and not a functioning labor organization." However, the idea of 
'fellowship' expressed by Dubofsky as characteristic of the postwar 
Wobblies seems actually to have been its great strength throughout its 
earlier and more vital period.21 
20Biographical information from Dubofsky, 238-239 (Haywood), 108 (Trautmann). 
21Dubofsky, 108, 238-239, 474. 
17 
While Foner and Dubofsky projected the radical alienation of IWW 
leaders on followers, Tyler dismissed possibilities of politicization among 
typical Wobbly recruits. He was immediately skeptical of their 
revolutionary fervor: 
Probably most transient workers became Wobblies at one time or 
another during their careers, either enthusiastically or because of 
coercive 'box-car recruiting.' But the dedicated Wobbly, the member 
remaining loyal even during the periods of calm between free-speech 
fights or wildcat strikes, was an uncommon creature even among the 
hoboes. 
Tyler maintained that the hobo culture of the West was antithetical to the 
stability that organization required. He concluded that easily transferable 
union cards and low dues turned the IWW into a social fellowship which 
functioned primarily to quell the loneliness of migratory existence.22 
Tyler acknowledged that the I.WW served to legitimate, even exalt, 
working-class culture in general and western hobo culture in particular 
through shared legends and art forms. He described a typical Wobbly 
cartoon "glorifying a sturdy workman who belabored serpents of 
capitalism with a formidable club labeled 'l.W.W.' from behind a shield 
labeled 'organization' or 'solidarity."' The shared songs and martyrs of the 
movement provided an almost portable community. Indeed, on this point, 
there seems to have been consensus between the leaders and the led. The 
language of I.WW propaganda incessantly reinforced the moral superiority 
of a productive laboring life. Tyler demonstrated how cartoons and songs 
were an accessible way to communicate values and established shared ideas 
22Tyler, 25-28. 
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between the top and bottom of the union.23 
Tyler argued that episodes of open battle against local authorities or 
bosses were the real substance of the Wobblies and emerged "only because 
of its failure as a labor union." Time and again Wobblies would help direct 
an industrial strike, leaving thousands of new members in its wake, only to 
have these tangible gains evaporate over mere months through poor 
administration. Jn the West, where the bulk of the membership could be 
found, efforts to maintain stable and efficient union locals were frustrated by 
a transient constituency. Thus, organizationally, the links between the union 
administration and the rank-and-file were tenuous indeed. Yet, Tyler 
ignored the many instances when the leadership won tangible gains by 
concentrating its forces upon a single location and issue.24 
Although the central leadership of the IWW was never successful at 
establishing competent regional and local administrations, it succeeded in 
channeling the anger of workers who could not practically be organized into 
traditional union structures. The leaders of the IWW adapted their 
organizational structure and tactics to fit their unconventional constituency, 
inevitably making the union itself highly unconventional. Tyler's synthesis 
emphasized the informal nature of the IWW as an organization but ignored 
the necessity for unconventional tactics in job circumstances not amenable to 
traditional union formats. As both a cultural community and a functioning 




methods to achieve them.25 
Salvatore Salerno's 1989 study of Wobbly ideology and culture made 
significant strides in understanding the internal dynamic of the union. 
Salerno's cultural synthesis of the Wobblies as a social movement was highly 
instructive and helped to resolve contentious issues concerning the 
relationship between leaders and led. Because he employed a macro thesis, 
Salerno's definitions can be universally applied to the union without regard 
to industry or region. This vast perspective led to his development of the 
concept of "a sensibility" holding sway within the organization rather "than 
a doctrine or formal ideology." This sensibility was responsible for giving 
"passage to the social networks that defined its community." Creation of a 
sensibility, "as opposed to ideological affiliation," changed the very nature 
of the possibilities of the union. Wobblies were able to "create a common 
cultural sphere whereby the various ethnic groups could be united on the 
basis of shared sentiment." Salerno insisted that the IWW had a cultural, 
rather than institutional, basis. Consequently, cultural influences, as much as 
economic and political, were to be recognized.26 
The focus of the present study is to build upon the notion of an IWW 
25Dubofsky, 173-175. 
26Salerno, Chapter 6. 
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'sensibility' established by Salerno and relate it to Townsend's analysis of 
conflict between western Wobblies and Progressives. Townsend's synthesis 
explained why two increasingly marginal groups struggled openly and 
bitterly against each other while often tolerating the very forces that 
marginalized them. Yet his work provided only a partial explanation of the 
conflicts he addressed. By concentrating on middle-class economic anxiety, 
he failed to deal with the virtual unanimity of Wobbly condemnation in 
western towns. Citizens from all walks of life proved themselves capable of 
language like that of Judge Davis of Minot, North Dakota who exclaimed: 
"We11 drive the God Damned Sons of Bitches into the river and drown 
them. We11 starve them. We11 kill every damned man of them or drive them 
together with the Socialists from the city."27 
Salerno suggested that a 'sensibility' among Wobblies could prove 
more bonding than ideology. This assertion raises the possibility that a 
shared 'sensibility' could unite individuals and organizations of varying 
beliefs within a single cultural sphere with a directed purpose. Such an 
analysis can apply to factions of Progressivism and radical labor alike. 
Despite their demonization by the contemporary press and subsequent 
glorification by recent historians, the Wobblies were capable of submerging 
themselves within coalitions, playing a much more minor role than they 
would inevitably be credited with. In keeping with this thinking, the 
relationship between the rank-and-file and the leadership within radical 
labor coalitions could be rather fluid, under constant negotiation. Similarly, 
27Townsend, 195. 
expansive anti-Wobbly coalitions raise the possibility of equally fluid, yet 
quite extensive, inter-class cooperation under the cultural umbrella of 
Progressivism. 
The Oregon Packing Company strike of July 1913, set in Portland, 
Oregon, will be the context in which this study will explicate the 
aforementioned concepts. Although not as violent as the most famous 'free 
speech fights,' the conflict was fought through bitter words and sometimes 
dramatic confrontations between a newly formed Progressive municipal 
administration, desperate to prove itself capable of preserving order, and a 
coalition of striking women, local radical socialists, and Wobblies. An 
explication of the cultural values of both factions will provide answers to 
the questions raised by the work of Townsend and Salerno, and will be the 
focus of the conclusion of this study. This thesis is intended to emphasize 
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On June 25, 1913, a mob of 600 Marshfield, Oregon residents marched 
IWW activists W.J. Edgeworth and Wesley Everett to the sea and sent them 
eight miles from the town, instructing them "to keep going and never return." 
Immediately following this deportation, two Wobblies who had just arrived in 
Marshfield received similar treatment. Before casting them off in a second boat, 
"a committee of citizens who had escorted them ... Made them get down on 
their bended knees and kiss the American flag." The event was marked by 
deeply felt emotion. The crowd sang patriotic songs, and the small coastal town 
virtually shut down for the parade to the sea. Edgeworth had been the 
Secretary of the IWW Local, and the seizure of his belongings after his 
deportation yielded the union roster. Local businessmen kept the roll records 
"for the clearing out of other I.WW." A local newspaper, The Times, was very 
admiring, asserting that "Coos Bay has cause today to be proud of the character 
of its citizenship," and describing the deportation parade as "one of the most 
remarkable demonstrations ever witnessed in any American city." It was the 
culmination of its fourteen month editorial tirade against the Wobblies. 1 
The IWW became active in the Coos County area of Oregon in 1911, 
although it had established a presence in Portland as early as 1907. A sparsely 
populated coastal area economically reliant upon timber, Coos was home to 
many a 'bindlestiff' ripe for IWW organization. The Times, typically, saw all 
Wobblies as alien, refusing to admit that some of the region's resident lumber 
workers responded positively to the union's appeals. In May 1913, matters 
1Morning Oregonian, June 26, 1913, p. 4; William G. Robbins, Hard Times in Paradise: 
Coos Bay, Oregon, 1850-1986 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988) 141-142. 
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came to a head when the IWW called an area-wide lumber camp strike to 
demand higher wages and an eight-hour day. William Robbins, an historian of 
the region, asserted that "newspaper editorials and commercial organizations 
on the bay had created an atmosphere of hatred against the IWW" by the 
middle of the month, the scheduled time to strike. Local businessmen were 
sworn in as special law enforcement officers, and braced for a fight. No 
disturbances actually occurred. However, Wobblies forced one logging camp to 
shut down and spurred partial walkouts in others. The action proved futile, but 
it enraged the propagandized citizenry and helped precipitate the mob scene 
that occurred the following month.2 
The populace of Coos had traditionally tolerated socialism. The Coos Bay 
Harbor stated in 1906 that "socialists number some of our best and foremost 
citizens." Yet the commercial and press campaign waged against the Wobblies 
during 1911-13 changed this praise to suspicion. Although Eugene Debs polled 
almost twice as many votes as the Democratic candidate in Coos during the 
1904 presidential election, evincing significant leftist sentiment in the region, 
tolerance waned after the Wobbly deportation. However, socialists who used 
restrained language and espoused traditional modes of industrial relations 
remained in favor. Anti-IWW propaganda in the region had drawn a clear line 
between working-class advocates who threatened violence and sabotage, and 
those that spoke of cooperation. A radical socialist centered in Marshfield, C.B. 
Ellis, wrote to Tom Burns, an associate in Portland, in late May 1913 describing 
2Robbins, 141; Lumbermen in the Pacific Northwest were often referred to as 
'bindlestiffs,' in reference to the practice of carrying a bundle of bedding from one camp to 
another in search of work; Robbins, 141. 
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the treatment that his beliefs had precipitated. He claimed that his "life and 
liberty are in hourly danger." He wrote of the disorganization of local socialists 
and the cowing of local business into a staunch anti-socialist stance by the 
Smith-Powers Company, local lumber baron. Ellis drew a clear distinction 
between himself and "the bourgeois element in the party here," who "could not 
be relied upon in a crisis." He described Marshfield as a "little stagnant 
community thoroughly permeated with petty local patriotism."3 
One of his few local allies was Bandon socialist and chiropracter Dr. 
Bailey Kay Leach, publisher of the radical journal Justice. Two weeks after the 
Wobbly deportation in Marshfield, a mob drove Leach from Bandon. F.K. 
Chapburne, "a Bandon Socialist and an esteemed citizen," stressed that the 
local party branch "looks with disfavor upon the intemperate and insulting 
language used by Leach in his paper." Association with the language used by 
the IWW was now enough to transform any individual into a pariah. However, 
Leach did not remain undefended. Governor Oswald West was outraged by 
the editor's deportation, and threatened local officials with removal for failing 
to discipline the mob. West blamed "the radical element of the IWW's and 
leading businessmen of Bandon" for the mob disturbances that spurred the 
deportations. He assigned the state Attorney General to the case, declaring that 
the Sheriff of Coos County should be removed. 4 
The Governor cast blame for creation of the mob upon timber baron Al 
Powers of the Smith-Powers Lumber Company, declaring that ''he has proved 
3Robbins, 140; C.B. Ellis, letter to Tom Burns, May 30, 1913, Tom Burns Papers, Oregon 
Historical Society, Portland, Oregon. 
40regonian, August 9, 1913, p. ; August 3, 1913, p. 6. 
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himself an enemy of society and an outlaw." Powers had risen from the 
position of water boy in Michigan lumber country at age thirteen to become a 
wealthy power broker on the southern Oregon coast who American Lumberman 
described as "the personification of energy." He was a classic example of the 
'self-made man' ethos that westerners still clung to despite its receding 
possibilities. West postured himself carefully, condemning the I.WW as well as 
Leach himself, but stressing the importance of the rule of law. He also railed 
against the hypocrisy of the industrial elite, claiming that Powers "would be the 
first to appeal to this office" if a mob attacked his mills, yet he "resorts to mob 
rule when it suits his convenience." Here clearly was an issue where the 
Governor could position himself as a law-and-order populist.5 
The Governor blamed "weak-kneed officials" for the development of 
I.WW activity, and stressed the necessity of strict enforcement of the law and the 
handing down of maximum legal penalties. The four Wobblies forcefully 
deported from Marshfield finally received notice as a component of West's case. 
Three days after the Governor referred the case to his Attorney General, the 
Oregonian reported that news of an investigation was "music to the ears of 
Sheriff W.W. Gage" of Coos Bay. The accused official "only feared that the 
Chief Executive would not carry out his promise in the matter." The Sheriff 
claimed that Dr. Leach "refused protection" and also "declined the good offices 
of Socialist friends." The doctor paid for his own boat fare, which the Sheriff 
took as evidence that he "was willing to take his departure immediately." Yet, 
that his departure was involuntary, and real protection non-existent, is clear. 
5Qregonian, August 3, 1913, p. 6; Robbins, 33-34; Oregonian, August 3, 1913, p. 6. 
When Leach's attorney wired the Sheriff that the doctor wished to return to 
Bandon from Myrtle Point immediately, but required protection, the Sheriff 
"found no warrant of law obliging him to act as an escort to any person." The 
case quickly died, however. Robbins cites election year politics as responsible 
for "the attorney general's whitewashing of the issue." A grand jury was 
appointed, but failed to reach a decision. No further action was taken.6 
On July 13, 1913, while tension emerging from the IWW led Oregon 
Packing Company strike gripped Portland, the Oregonian informed its readers 
in a dramatic front-page story that the "IWW LEAD MOVE TO DISRUPT 
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ARMY." Correspondent Will MacRae reported from Fort Stevens, near Astoria, 
that "the first prying of the lid to the gigantic IWW plot to disorganize and 
demoralize the Army and Navy" was taking place. MacRae insisted that: 
the higher ups have selected a class of men, made dangerous by a little 
education, and have urged them to join the Army and Navy so they 
could spread the doctrine of discontent and opposition when the 
bayonets of the government are directed against rioters and sabotage. 
His findings were based upon "days of close investigation" and "heart-to-heart 
talks" with both socialists and non-socialists connected to the investigations at 
the fort.7 
The mysterious murder of a Private Crawford at the fort had been 
60regonian, August 3, 1913, p. 6; August 6, 1913, p. 5; Robbins, 142. 
70regonian, July 13, 1913, p. l. 
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quickly followed by the desertion of a Sergeant Leary after it had become clear 
that he had been responsible for pamphleting the saloons of nearby Hammond 
with socialist literature. A shack in the woods behind the fort was then 
discovered, a sort of socialist reading room for interested soldiers. These events 
caused a whirl of investigation, including attempts to link the active socialist 
chapter in Astoria, and even the Pacific headquarters of the Army at the 
Presidio in San Francisco, to these events. The alleged immediate discovery of a 
Secret Service agent relocated to the fort from San Francisco, as well as Leary's 
supposed tip off concerning his imminent arrest, led to fears that the IWW had 
access to secret cables at both the Presidio and Fort Stevens.8 
Scapegoats emerged immediately. Private Coffman, an allegedly 
obstreperous member of the Astoria socialists, and a soldier at the fort, emerged 
as an example, and was tried for making seditious remarks. A man MacRae 
referred to as Lawton, "a constructive and not a destructive Socialist," who quit 
the Astoria group in protest after Coffman was admitted, objected to his 
"violent remarks" and advocacy of "free love." While Lawton was described as 
holding a "thoroughly philosophical view of Socialism," a later article implied 
that Coffman held completely untenable opinions concerning the compatibility 
of socialism and anarchy. As in the Coos County press, an understood 
demarcation between responsible and reek.less socialism is clear. Certainly, the 
Wobblies helped lend definition, and raise alarm over, the latter type. Four 
other soldiers were also brought up on charges, including a Private Johnson, 
accused of stealing a pint flask of Dennite, described as the most powerful and 
8Jbid. 
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secret explosive material in existence. The IWW, in this context, emerged as an 
organization truly feared as a potent revolutionary force. Yet, the absence of 
significant federal intervention prior to World War I denigrates the assertion 
that the Wobblies truly were a threat to either the nation's defense or industrial 
production capacity.9 
While the Fort Stevens trials and the accusations against Coos Bay 
authorities began to grind through the courts, a truly explosive event in 
Wheatland, California heightened already strong anti-Wobbly sentiment on the 
Pacific coast. On August 3, 1913, a peaceful protest meeting of 400 striking 
hoppickers on the Durst ranch erupted into violence when a posse, composed 
of sheriff, district attorney, constable, and deputies, arrived at the ranch and 
waded into the crowd to arrest their leader. A warning shot was fired to calm 
the crowd, but had the opposite effect. A melee erupted, leaving District 
Attorney Manwell, a deputy sheriff, and two hoppickers dead after perhaps 
twenty shots had been fired. lo 
The origins of this tragic protest remain unclear. Typically, authorities 
immediately shouldered the Wobblies with full blame. In his official report to 
9Qregonian, July 13, 1913, p. 1; July 25, 1913, p. 12; July 20, 1913, p. 7. 
lOContemporary narrative found in Oregonian, August 4, 1913, p. 1. Historical narrative 
found in Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement of the United States, Volume IV: The 
Industrial Workers of the World, 1905-1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1965) 258-280. 
the Governor in fulfillment of his duties as Executive Secretary for the State 
Immigration and Housing Commission of California, Carleton Parker 
completed a contemporary factual and statistical record of this event that 
would be impossible for a historian to surpass. Parker compiled the affidavits 
of 97 witnesses, 57 of whom he presented as "perfectly reliable." Yet, his 
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interpretations of the evidence presented, and his judgment of what comprises 
reliability, seem highly suspect. Vincent DiGirolamo has found that Parker was 
contemptuous of male migrant workers, particularly foreigners. After a 1913-14 
study of 222 California migrant males revealed to him that over three-quarters 
were unmarried and a substantial majority planned to drift from place to place 
indefinitely, he deemed this class morally inferior. Another report conducted by 
Parker, in conjunction with the Stanford University Department of Education, 
tested 200 migrant laborers and deemed a quarter of them to be "feeble-
minded." 11 
In Parker's opinion, foreign workers on the Durst ranch "had, as a rule, 
unclean personal and camp habits, exposed themselves at the pumps in 
washing, and were indecently careless in the presence of women and children." 
Although, as a solid Progressive, Parker deplored the camp conditions, he 
never speculated if perhaps these alleged unclean and indecent habits were 
unavoidable given the circumstances. One witness, cited by DiGirolamo, 
asserted that "the moral conditions of these hop-fields are notoriously lax," 
perhaps owing to Durst's failure to provide tents or segregate families from 
11Carleton H. Parker, The Casual Laborer and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Howe, 1920) 176; Vincent DiGirolamo, "The Women of Wheatland: Female 
Consciousness and the 1913 Wheatland Hop Strike" Labor History 34 (Spring 1993) 236-255. 
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single migrants. The provision of only five wells and two hydrants for 2,738 
individuals, often emptied before the day had barely begun, surely contributed 
to the state of affairs. There were also only between eight and eleven toilets, 
"one-tenth of the army minimum," which quickly became too foul to use, and 
resulted in "women humiliating themselves before passing men," and children 
in "unspeakably filthy condition." Sickness became rampant, and the heat 
unbearable, to workers denied even free water by Durst.12 
Of the 2,738 individuals in the camp, Parker's study found 1,438 to be 
foreigners. He also asserted that of the total number there were 700 or 800 
hoboes who were "in every sense potential 1.W.W. strikers," at least 400 who 
knew the "philosophy of the l.W.W. and could also sing some of its songs," and 
100 card-holding IWW members. Thirty of the latter group, he claimed, 
organized the camp in merely three days. Placing a small number of Wobblies 
as sole instigators and organizers of the protest seems simplistic given the 
limited time frame and large number of migrants, half of whom had varying 
degrees of difficulty speaking English and had over two dozen disparate native 
tongues. Although this causal paradigm has become a commonplace 
assumption in historical analysis of the event, DiGirolamo has used 
photographs indicative of social patterns at the ranch to conclude that the camp 
was not "just heterogenous hop pickers, but a community." Cletus Daniel also 
points out that "in their initial responses to news of the Wheatland riot, Wobbly 
spokesmen insisted that none of those named as strike leaders was an IWW 
12Parker, 174; DiGirolamo, 240; Parker, 182; DiGirolamo, 241. 
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cardholder. "13 
Authorities responded with a state-wide manhunt for the Wobbly 
leaders they felt to be responsible for the deaths of the district attorney and 
deputy sheriff. The search resulted in the trial of four men in January 1914, and 
ended with the conviction of two of them. It was fairly typical in contemporary 
disturbances involving any alleged Wobblies for authorities to overshadow any 
other possible motivations for group action. DiGirolamo's innovative study has 
credited consciousness and social patterns among women in the Durst camp 
with the ease with which a network of solidarity was quickly constructed. Little 
evidence of a direct Wobbly conspiracy exists. Daniel found that California 
JWW locals in 1913 had virtually given up on successfully organizing migrant 
workers until "the Pacific Coast was further industrialized." Even after 
Wheatland had provided the impetus for unionizing the fields, Wobbly leaders 
in the state continued to emphasize political agitation over organization.14 
Yet, while Daniel has seen already meager efforts to unionize migratory 
workers in decline, the contemporary view was markedly different. In his 
official report of the event, Parker stated that it was now common for hoboes in 
the state to know JWW songs by heart and to sing them whenever they found 
themselves in groups. But, he continued, "this was not so three years ago." 
Although Parker clearly understood that Wheatland was not a Wobbly plot 
fomented from the outside by the leadership, he saw the spread of JWW 
doctrine creating a "small army" of roaming migrants who would start trouble 
13Parker, 189; DiGirolarno, 245; Cletus E. Daniel, "In Defense of the Wheatland 
Wobblies: A Critical Analysis of the IWW in California" Labor History 19 (Fall 1978) 493. 
14Daniel, 492-493. 
wherever they could. He reported that "the l.W.W. is teaching a method of 
direct action which will give this class expression in violent flare-ups" while 
leaving no lasting organization. Parker seems to have been extrapolating such 
conclusions from the violent 'free speech fights' at Fresno and San Diego, both 
quite recent, and the dearth of any constructive activity in the wake of 
Wheatland. The leadership's revolutionary rhetoric and emphasis on political 
action pushed suspicions onto the rank-and-file of fomenting violence for its 
own sake.ts 
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The evidence that survives of the riot at the Durst ranch contradicts the 
validity of such characterizations. Although Parker called IWW propaganda in 
California a "criminal conspiracy," it seems that camp conditions on the Durst 
Ranch were a much stronger impetus to action than inflammatory doctrines. 
Three days hardly seems adequate for a handful of men to indoctrinate 
hundreds of individuals, half of whom were not native English speakers. And 
the alleged Wobbly organizers were preaching passive resistance, not the direct 
action through sabotage and violence condemned by Parker. Richard 'Blackie' 
Ford, a former Wobbly and the workers' spokesman on the ranch, held up a 
sick baby to the peaceful crowd and exclaimed "it's for the kids that we're 
doing this!" No mention of revolution. Clearly, the abysmal conditions at the 
camp, and Durst's intransigence, triggered a campaign of passive resistance 
formed by a community with common grievances and goals that were both 
simple and immediate. Wobbly propaganda and the past experience of IWW 
veterans perhaps increased the pace of events, but it seems unlikely that Ford 
15Parker, 190-191. 
and the other leaders had come to the ranch merely to agitate. Their tactics, 
negotiation in good faith and passive resistance, were clearly at odds with the 
Wobbly tradition.16 
Demonization of the IWW completely out of proportion to its activities 
similarly thrived in Seattle. The trouble had begun when a newly elected 
progressive Democrat Mayor, George F. Cotterill, replaced Hiram Gill in 1912. 
Gill had been recalled by an outraged citizenry for his complicity in Seattle's 
thriving vice industry. Cotterill's administration focused on restoring civic 
pride in municipal government through elimination of vice and official 
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corruption. In replacing Gill, however, Cotterill earned a potent enemy, Colonel 
Alden J. Blethen. The Colonel (his title of dubious origin) "worshipped the 
military with a school boy's simplicity" and exhibited a chauvinistic brand of 
patriotism. Yet, he had been a firm backer of the corrupt Gill administration 
and ran a sensationalist newspaper, the Seattle Times, which held the truth in 
little regard and was widely criticized for conjuring conspiracies.17 
The events of 1912 framed an antagonistic relationship that would come 
to focus on tolerance of free speech, and that of socialists in particular. 
Cotterill's Progressivist instincts drove him to balance public demand for order 
16Parker, 193; DiGirolarno, 236. 
17Robert L. Tyler, Rebels of the Woods: The !.W.W. in the Pacific Northwest (Eugene: 
University of Oregon Books, 1967) 44-45. 
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with concerns that legality not be flouted by civic authorities. Sensitive to public 
outrage against corruption and private use of public power, Cotterill intended 
to be careful in his use of the police force. Blethen, conversely, chafed at the idea 
of rights for socialists. In 1912, Leonard Olsson, a Wobbly from Tacoma, lost his 
citizenship in a federal court that found he had committed fraud during the 
naturalization process. His transgression was found to be the maintenance of 
loyalty to the United States, which was deemed in direct contradiction with his 
later discovered Wobbly membership. Such treatment was not unique. Judge 
William Galloway, presiding over the federal circuit centered in the Albany 
area of Oregon, announced in late July, 1913, that all applicants for citizenship 
in his jurisdiction would have to pass an IWW litmus test. In support of his 
decision, Galloway told the press that "membership in that organization is 
almost prima facie evidence that a man is unfit for citizenship." After a long 
campaign by socialists and Wobblies, Olsson regained his citizenship through 
appeal in February 1913. Although this was hardly a setback for anti-Wobbly 
legal repression, Blethen was indignant over the mayor's tolerance of public 
protests in support of Olsson. Particularly galling was official permission for a 
May Day parade in 1912, in which the red flag and the American flag were 
carried side by side, precipitating riot. Cotterill had actually created this 
situation as a compromise, mediating between socialist factions and citizen 
groups.ls 
The issue of the red flag was an emotional one, and Blethen was far from 
isolated in his opinions. Local socialists attempted to stage a satirical play 
18Tyler, 44-45; Oregonian, July 31, 1913, p. 7; Tyler 45. 
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unfavorable to both Colonel Blethen and veterans titled "The Colonel and his 
Friends" in the Moore Theater in late July, 1913. Spanish-American War 
veterans threatened to pack the theater and riot at the first hint of insult to the 
American flag. A seeming continuation of the May Day controversy of the 
previous year, the Mayor again stated that he had no authority to stop the play, 
but that he would again negotiate a settlement. Socialists agreed to avoid 
statements in the production indicating that Blethen controlled the local 
veterans, and to abstain from insulting use of the flag. They further promised to 
refrain from recreating the May Day riot of the previous year. This time, 
Cotterill's compromise maintained the peace. The play remained a point of 
contention, however, and the manager of the Tacoma Theater refused it a 
showing in his town.19 
The antagonism over the proper extent of First Amendment rights for 
Seattle socialists that reemerged concurrently with the production of "The 
Colonel and his Friends," and large I_WW street meetings, was brought on by 
the most serious anti-leftist violence the city had yet seen. On July 18, 1913, the 
Potlatch Days festival hosted by Seattle erupted in violence. Large crowds of 
sailors and soldiers had been given leave to attend the festival, planned as a 
summer tourist attraction by local businessmen. The trouble seems to have 
emerged from two vague and exaggerated reports in the Seattle Times. The first 
concerned the contents of a speech made by Secretary of the Navy Josephus 
Daniels to Seattle's exclusive Rainier Club on the evening of July 17. A routine 
patriotic speech that Daniels had used time and again during his national tour 
19Qregonian, July 26, 1913, p. 4; July 29, 1913, p. 5. 
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on behalf of the new Wilson administration, was manipulated by the Times to 
appear as a repudiation of Mayor Cotterill's supposed tolerance of local 
socialists and their denigration of the national flag. That this was Daniels' intent 
hardly seems likely, for not only was Cotterill, like President Wilson, a 
progressive Democrat, but he had served as the Secretary's host and sat behind 
him on the stage during his speech at the club. Despite the fact that the 
Secretary later claimed that "what I said last night concerning patriotism had 
no reference to any situation in Seattle," the front-page article written by M.M. 
Mattison in Blethen's paper seems to have been persuasive.20 
The second article, a brief scuffle reported by the Times in the same issue, 
set off a riotous mob on a parade of destruction. In the wake of the paper's 
vague description of the event, a rumor spread that several servicemen had 
been injured after interfering with an IWW street meeting. This rumor, after 
"smoke has cleared away," was entirely discredited by the Seattle Daily Sun, as 
ardent a supporter of Cotterill as an opponent of Blethen. The paper stated that 
the truth of the supposed initial altercation between enlisted men and 
Wobblies, backed by the affidavits of witnesses and the official reports of 
military officers, was completely at odds with the Times' account. The 
confrontation that instigated the rumors did not actually involve the IWW at 
all. Annie Miller, a women's rights advocate, was antagonized by an 
intoxicated soldier who later returned with similarly inebriated companions 
and removed her speaking stand, staging a mock meeting of their own. The 
crowd laughed, until Mrs. Miller attempted to retake her stand and the soldier 
20'fyler, 45-46; Oregonian, July 19, 1913, p. 4. 
who instigated the whole disturbance raised his hand to strike her. A "well-
dressed man, with a diamond ring," stepped out of the crowd to defend her. 
The man's appearance precludes him from being a Wobbly, and Mrs. Miller 
was similarly unconnected to the union.21 
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The brawl that followed quickly became distorted to scapegoat the IWW, 
and rioting ensued. As the rumor spread, crowds of servicemen and 
sympathetic civilians formed to take revenge. One party "waving United States 
flags ... swooped down on the cart newsstand of Millard Price," who sold 
socialist literature, and smashed it to pieces. The group then came across a 
recently vacated Wobbly headquarters, and proceeded to move on to the 
nearest socialist hall. Upon finding it, they smashed in the plate glass window, 
tore signs off and nailed flags to the edifice of the building, and were only 
molested by police after attempting to drag books and furniture out into the 
street. Previously, the "policemen smiled complacently upon the wreckers." 
The crowd, en route to further destructive activity, was waylaid by a police 
captain with reinforcements who ordered the group to disperse. The Oregonian 
reported shouts of: "your Mayor won't do anything to protect the flag, so we 
are saving your city" and "go and get Mayor Cotterill" emanating from the 
mob. This account lends strong credence to the notion that the Times report of 
Daniels' speech was responsible for the violent reaction to the rumor of a clash 
between servicemen and Wobblies. The mob reformed further north in the city 
and a new group emerged in the south. The former group finished the 
destruction of the socialist headquarters begun earlier, while the latter group 
21Tyler, 45-46; Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 1st Session (1913) 2904-2905. 
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finally found and sacked the IWW hall. Several more socialist meeting places 
were set upon, and a Salvation Army office was also mistakenly destroyed in 
the frenzy. When a mob of one thousand passed the Rainier Oub, its members 
reportedly lined up and saluted before moving on.22 
Cotterill responded to the crisis by obtaining an injunction to shut down 
the Seattle Times, and closed the city's taverns until the conclusion of the 
festivities. Blethen quickly overturned the injunction, and blasted the Mayor in 
his July 20 issue. Cotterill was forced to respond with a lengthy defense of his 
conduct in the Seattle Daily Sun. Both Cotterill and U.S Representative J.W. 
Bryan tried to win reparations for those whose property had been destroyed. 
When Cotterill presented demands to the City Council, however, the police 
force, which had been quite passive during the incident, denied Seattle's 
liability. Bryan asked Congress to pay for the damage, citing the 
blameworthiness of the U.S. Navy, but was declared out of order for presenting 
an appropriation as a resolution. Wobblies and socialists even sent a joint 
delegate to the Capitol to present their case, to no avail. Immediately after the 
riots, the Seattle IWW held a series of large outdoor meetings downtown, which 
resulted in an injunction sought by local businessmen on the grounds that the 
commercial district was being thoroughly disrupted. After briefly flouting the 
court order, Wobblies desisted before a full-blown 'free speech fight' could 
emerge.23 
22Qregonian, July 19, 1913, p. 1, 4. 
23Tyler, 46-47; Congressional Record, 2903-2904; Tyler, 47-48. 
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Labor relations and industrial reform in early twentieth century America 
operated within the context of a Progressive world-view, which emerged as 
"the expression of a profound cultural crisis caused by the rapid urbanization 
and industrialization of the nation during the nineteenth century." The hope 
that the United States "would be saved from the terror of history just because it 
was agricultural" could no longer survive as an article of civic faith. By the late 
nineteenth century, a movement of various coalitions emerged with disparate 
ideologies, but a remarkably consistent focus on the importance of economic 
self-determination for communities and a quest for social "purity and unity." 
Desires for economic independence were primarily expressed through 
antimonopolism, while the social purity movement often expressed itself 
through a rejuvenated Protestantism. As Daniel Rodgers has suggested, 
Progressive social reform did not have a common agenda but shared three 
separate "languages of discontent" containing universal symbols. Rodgers has 
pointed to the importance of strains of antimonopolism, "a rhetoric of social 
cohesion" to replace emphasis on the individual, and "the language of social 
efficiency." He has emphasized that these languages were rife with 
contradictions, yet helped to focus ferment on "arbitrary, unregulated 
individual power."1 
Antimonopolism had long held a place in American cultural discourse 
prior to the 1890s, dating back at least to Andrew Jackson dismantling the 
Second Bank of the United States in 1832 in an attempt to further democratize 
1David W. Noble, The Progressive Mind, 1890-1917 (Minneapolis: Alpha Editions, 1981) 
1; Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967) 52, 56; 
Daniel T. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism" Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982) 
123. 
access to credit and disperse power more evenly throughout the banking 
industry. The perceived popularity of the 'Bank War' was perhaps its most 
important driving force within the Jackson administration. Rodgers has 
asserted that antimonopolism in the Progressive era had a new and important 
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facet; it had "gained the acceptance of insiders." While populist discontent with 
the centralization of power in the economy can be traced from Jackson to 
agrarian populism, the end of the century brought a recognizance by the urban 
middle-classes that government intervention was required. Rodgers proposed 
three potential explanations for this development: the "sudden ... ascendancy of 
finance capitalism," the rapid growth of monopolistic urban services networks, 
and a growing middle-class desire for the excitement provided by muckraking 
journalism.2 
The source of the grievances of rural middle-class entrepreneurs is much 
more clear. Wiebe has noted that "two bursts of railroad construction" 
following 1879 and 1885 saw more track laid than at any time in the nation's 
history. The main lines between cities had already been built; this was largely 
'feeder' track to join previously isolated rural communities to main railroad 
lines. Regional competition among individual merchants did not increase as 
result of the expansion of 'feeder' track, for "integrated wholesale houses" 
became the standard means of purchasing goods for retail sale by the 1880s. 
Consumers now had less flexible credit with local merchants, for these 
entrepreneurs in turn were reliant on large and impersonal providers of bulk 
2Discussion of antimonopolism in the Jacksonian era from Richard Hofstadter, The 
American Political Tradition (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1973); Rodgers, 123-124. 
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goods. Previously, the business world had been relationship-based for these 
individuals, both as merchants and consumers. Now, far-off financiers and 
administrators determined many of the financial aspects of intra-communal 
relationships. Perceived theft of economic autonomy would draw the 
entrepreneurial middle-classes, urban and rural, into the previously agrarian 
populist chorus for federal regulation of the business world. The passage of the 
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 are 
evidence of the vocalization of such demands.3 
What Rodgers referred to as "the language of social bonds" and Wiebe 
as "a preoccupation with purity and unity" was an outgrowth of the dramatic 
shifts in American social life brought about by the nationalization of the 
economy and the centralization of distribution networks. New cultural 
definitions were required for what appeared to be a new kind of society, and a 
public demand to participate in the humanization of these transformations 
arose. Rodgers pointed out that the rhetoric of unity often took on opposing 
guises, citing Theodore Roosevelt's focus on "the social whole" and Jane 
Addams' focus on immediately interactive social units such as family and 
community. Common ground on the issue of social unity was reached, Wiebe 
asserted, through Protestantism.4 
The research of Charles Howard Hopkins into the transformation of 
American Protestant theology in the late nineteenth century indicates that the 
religious community was coming to terms with modernity. Hopkins has noted 
3Wiebe, 47-49, 52-54. 
4Rodgers, 125; Wiebe, 63. 
42 
that progressive theologians accepted Darwinian theory in the 1890s, leading to 
a belief in "the divine presence in nature and in human society." These 
individuals determined that the alienation of the masses from religion had 
emerged from a false separation of the sacred and the secular. "Good works 
have been subordinated to sanctification," lamented Professor Charles Briggs of 
the Union Theological Seminary, "rendering [Protestantism] unresponsive to 
the needs of modem life." Briggs noted that this policy had been responsible 
not only for forcing humanitarian work outside the churches, but had even 
occasionally garnered the opposition of religious leaders to such activity. In 
1899, Professor Graham Taylor of the Chicago Theological Seminary delivered 
an address to the International Congregational Council in Boston on the 
modem mission of the church. Taylor stressed the need for a "science of 
Christian society" and the imperative of launching social movements from 
within the church. This new 'social gospel' provided a massive social network 
and ideological impetus to reform activity in American life.s 
Rodgers' third strand of discourse in Progressivism was "the rhetoric of 
social efficiency." This more academic mode of idea sharing put "social 
disorder into words and remedies free of the embarrassing pieties and 
philosophical conundrums that hovered around the competing language of 
social bonds." It was the language of an emerging class of technocrats that 
sought to rationalize society on a secular scientific basis, yet it successfully 
integrated itself with many of the goals of the 'social gospel.' The urban 
5Charles Howard Hopkins, The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 
1865-1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940) 123, 136-138. 
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political rebirth promised by the commission form of government began to take 
hold in 1909, while advocates of scientific management proposed the 
elimination of waste and class conflict in American industry in 1910.6 
Frederick W. Taylor's theories captured the public imagination as a salve 
to the alienation of factory life and the perceived growth of class warfare. 
Taylor emphasized that workers were to be treated as individuals in order to 
assess their capabilities, introducing "individualism into the factory." He 
simultaneously limited the prerogatives of capitalists by attacking "the cult of 
personality in management" and attempting to establish the primacy of 
"methods" over "particular men." Taylor's theories seemed to contain the 
notion of brotherhood extant in the 'social gospel,' for although workers would 
lose what little control they maintained over work practices, foremen would 
lose the right to hire and fire them arbitrarily. It was a vision of factory 
communities, that although not quite viable in practice, provided a popular 
image of peaceful and consumer oriented industry.7 
All three of Rodgers's languages of Progressivism converged upon the 
most dramatic manifestation of the age, the city. During the period between 
1870 and 1920, rural residents and foreign immigrants poured into towns at a 
stunning rate, transforming them into cities often over only brief periods. The 
urban population expanded from ten to fifty-four million over this half-century. 
Between 1870 and 1920, the number of cities of 50,000 and greater grew almost 
six-fold. As early as 1890, practically all urban centers destined to achieve 
6Rodgers, 126-127. 
7Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 
1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) x, 23-25. 
moderate size had appeared. In the West, more than half the population came 
to reside in towns. Richard Hofstadter has suggested that "the whole cast of 
American thinking in this period was deeply affected by the experience of the 
rural mind confronted with the phenomena of urban life." The personal, well-
ordered, and homogeneous small towns and rural areas from which most 
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native immigrants to urban areas came left them completely unprepared for the 
chaotic mix of ethnicity and the impersonal crowding of the modem American 
city.8 
The rise of American industry after the Civil War necessitated a work 
force more massive than the domestic population could provide, bringing 
immigrants streaming into the country in unprecedented numbers. Early 
twentieth century immigration "concentrated heavily on the cities," and 
dramatically shifted the demographics of urban environments. By 1910, John 
Higham has noted, over thirteen million foreign-born individuals were living in 
the United States. However, he asserted that "the immigrants never swamped 
the older Americans in any major city" despite noting five major cities that 
were three-quarters foreign born or first generation American. Yet, the cultural 
impact of the foreign born was tremendous. Immigrants forged "an urban mass 
culture to replace the traditions they could not transplant intact." The 
predominance of Protestantism was shattered, urban political machines were 
created to function on terms of ethnic loyalty, and popular culture was 
transformed. Such dramatic movements of people and convergence of cultures 
8 Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington: U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, 1975) 11-12; Blake McKelvey, The Urbanization of America, 1860-1915 (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963) 19; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: 
From Bryan to F.D.R (New York: Vintage Books, 1955) 176-177. 
within brief time frames were inevitably chaotic. Consequently, urban areas 
quickly became a major focus of Progressive ferment. 9 
The National Union for Practical Progress provides a clear example of 
the diverse coalitions quickly established among Progressives to retake the 
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cities at the end of the nineteenth century. By mid-1894, forty cities had formed 
affiliated chapters of the organization. Paul Boyer has judged the group's goals 
to be "impossibly diverse, and its tactics nebulous at best." They intended to 
raise a new moral issue each month through the publication Arena, which had 
sponsored the formation of the group, and launch "study groups and publicity 
campaigns" in addition to pursuing political lobbying. Other urban reform 
organizations were rife in this period, their agenda "vague and concrete results 
few." Boyer asserted that these groups felt the stakes to be critical and 
traditional methods to be inadequate. A truly national movement "as dedicated 
as any religious revival, as coordinated as any military campaign" would be 
required. He suggested that the most alarmed Progressives took on a 'coercive' 
stance focused on actively repressing immorality, while others espoused an 
'environmentalist' philosophy that would transform "the city's physical 
environment as a means of elevating its moral tone." In both approaches, a 
sharp divergence from earlier methods of urban reform was effected. Instead of 
the volunteerism of the past that focused on reforming individuals, 
Progressives sought to bring to bear ''broad programs utilizing a full panoply of 
governmental power and aimed at a fundamental restructuring of the urban 
9Hofstadter, 177; John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) 14-15, 25, 21, 25-27. 
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environment."10 
The primary method for communicating conditions that required reform 
to a national audience was the thriving print news industry. For Progressive 
reform to succeed, a rank-and-file native middle-class was required to vote for 
reform and support local organizations. While some publications, like Arena, 
consciously supported Progressivism, many others unwittingly aided the cause 
by sensationalizing Progressive targets such as urban poverty and political 
corruption in order to boost sales. Newsprint coverage of urban blight caused 
increased concern with morality in slum neighborhoods, many of which had 
appeared quite rapidly as cities dramatically industrialized and grew in 
population around the turn of the century. And as an increasingly large amount 
of space was given over to advertisements, newspapers seemed to define their 
readers as consumers and those who could not hope to obtain the goods 
displayed upon their pages as 'the other half.'11 
Alan Trachtenberg has asserted that "in technologies of communication, 
vicarious experience began to erode direct physical experience of the world" 
during the late nineteenth century. He referred to the dramatically expanding 
newspaper readership in this period as increasingly passive "consumers of 
images and sensations produced by others." More towns than ever before 
boasted a newspaper, with the number of daily news publications increasing by 
almost half and circulation more than doubling between 1892 and 1914. Urban 
10Paul Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978) 163-164, 175, 190. 
1 lAlan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture & Society in the Gilded 
Age (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) 126-127. 
newspapers and national magazines found themselves in escalating 
competition to present the most thrilling stories of adventure obtainable. 
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However, they were hampered by the uniformity of the news reports they 
shared, taken mostly from increasingly powerful telegraphic news agencies. Yet 
the many cities that experienced rapid growth and economic change never 
lacked for local Progressivist drama.12 
The stunning early twentieth century growth of Portland, Oregon makes 
that city a window into the urban transformations of Progressive era America. 
Between 1900 and 1910, Portland jumped in population from 90,000 to 207,214 
(129% increase), the second highest rate of growth among cities of over 50,000. 
Yet, despite its vast expansion over a brief period, Portland did not experience 
any remarkable diversity in sources of immigration. The southern and eastern 
European immigrants that were streaming into early twentieth century eastern 
and middle western cities were few in number in Portland. There was a sizable 
Russian contingent by 1910 (almost 4,000), and a somewhat smaller number of 
Italians (less than 3,000), but other groups that characterized the bulk of 
immigration in this period were largely absent. In 1910, four of the five largest 
immigrant groups in Portland were northern European in descent. Many of the 
12Trachtenberg, 122; Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism, a History: 1690-1960 
(New York: Macmillan, 1962) 547-549; Trachtenberg, 123-124. 
individuals who were moving to Portland did not differ drastically from those 
who had traditionally lived there. Stephen Janik has found that recent 
immigrants to the city tended to be middle or skilled working class and 
relocated to Portland after having already lived elsewhere in America. While 
many cities that had expanded rapidly battled staggering English illiteracy, 
Portland's rate in 1910 was merely 1.3%, second best in the nation for a city of 
its population level. The largest ethnic group was German, comprising only 
3.6% of the local population and not isolated in particular neighborhoods. 
Similarly, William Toll has found that although Portland had nearly 3,000 
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Italian immigrants by 1910, they "did not dominate any single neighborhood." 
The only significant ethnic neighborhood was a two precinct section of the 
Portland waterfront occupied by Chinese immigrants.13 
Portland's burst of Progressive fervor, unlike that of its counterparts 
further east, did not feature the sudden shock of heterogeneity as a major causal 
factor. However, the impact of industrialization on reform is clear. Between 
1900-10, the number of Portlanders in personal service occupations declined 
39% and the number of men engaged in agriculture declined 51 %. The number 
of professionals in the city increased 99% and the number of men in 
manufacturing increased nearly 230%. Stephen Janik has noted that by 1910, 
one of three employed Portland men worked in the manufacturing sector. The 
dramatic increase in manufacturing not only brought more professionals to the 
13Stephen T. Janik, "Prosperity and the Pursuit of Order: Portland, Oregon during the 
Progressive Era, 1900-1913" B.A. (Hon.) thesis, Harvard College, 1969, 22-23; Paul G. Merriam, 
"The 'Other Portland': A Statistical Note on Foreign-Born, 1860-1910" Oregon Historical 
Quarterly 80 (Fall 1979) 266, 268; Janik, 22-23; William Toll, "Ethnicity and Stability: The Italians 
and Jews of South Portland, 1900-1940" Pacific Historical Review 54 (May 1985) 166-167; Janik, 22-
23. 
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city, but significantly increased the amount of wealth that passed through 
Portland. Janik used a single fiscal year, 1909-10, to explicate the transition. 
Over this one year, the value of bank transfers in Portland increased nearly 
40%, and that of real estate transfers jumped almost 300%. Portland had become 
a major commercial center, fourth in the nation in exports. As the level of 
wealth increased, so did geographical social segregation. By 1915, Portland 
historian Kim MacColl has pointed out, this trend had become "a fact of life." 
More than 60% of Portland's residents lived east of the river, many of whom 
commuted to the west where commerce was centered and the wealthy lived. 
The effects of this financial and geographical transformation on the values of 
the community were tremendous. Janik found a transition from a community 
composed of independent individuals, to one in which interdependence was 
inescapable. As self-employment dwindled, reliance on municipal 
infrastructure services increased, and the scope of vice and corruption 
expanded, the search for order became frenetic.14 
The campaign to rationalize municipal governance and services in order 
to eradicate vice and plutocratic corruption characterized Progressive era 
Portland. A small group of Republican politicians (Portland voter registration 
was over 80% Republican) with often formal business ties controlled municipal 
politics, setting zoning and land use regulations, awarding franchises, and 
overlooking the legal transgressions of industry and wealthy property holders. 
Portland was not unique. Contemporary journalist Lincoln Steffens found the 
14Janik, 24-25; E. Kimbark MacColl, The Shaping of a City: Business and Politics in 
Portland, Oregon, 1885 to 1915 (Portland, OR: The Georgian Press, 1976) 393, 15; Janik, 26. 
50 
urban businessman in 1903 to be a "self-righteous fraud" and "the chief source 
of corruption" who "has failed in politics as he has failed in citizenship." Over 
the course of the decade, national dissatisfaction with municipal governance 
prompted a panoply of options for the redesign of state and local politics. In 
Oregon, initiative and referendum reforms approved in 1902, and the direct 
primary system passed in 1904, diminished party loyalty and paved the way for 
Progressive reformers to enter office and fundamentally change the governance 
of the state.15 
Oswald West, elected governor on the Democratic ticket in 1910, in a 
thoroughly Republican state and with little money or establishment support, 
exemplified the decline in party loyalty and surge of reformist passion that 
emerged in this period. West was but thirty-seven years old when he declared 
his candidacy and proclaimed in his 'Declaration of Principles' that "the people 
must rule the corporations or the corporations will rule the State." As State 
Land Agent and State Railroad Agent he had established a reputation for 
exposing corruption and eliminating preferential practices. 
Yet, the last fifteen member council the city would elect before Progressives 
swept the institution away in 1913 failed to reflect the success of the West 
candidacy. The council "was an average chamber of commerce or commercial 
club group which varied little in character from those of the previous decade 
except that realtor representation was doubled."16 
The vice issue would dominate Portland politics, and Governor West, 
15MacColl, 6-7; Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: Sagamore Press, 
1957) 3; Maccoll, 7. 
16MacColl, 396-398, 401-402. 
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whose own father had been an alcoholic, would distinguish himself as a tireless 
crusader. However, the city council and the "colorless" A.G. Rushlight, new 
Republican mayor and long-serving city councilman, wavered between 
recalcitrance and ineffectiveness. This contrast would help elicit support for a 
more professional and non-partisan method of municipal governance. While, in 
response to public demand, Rushlight had immediately created a fifteen 
member Vice Commission of the City of Portland, its eventual report, although 
startling, was filed away and forgotten by municipal authorities. In August 
1912, one year after the ignored vice commission had been created, West 
declared he would clean up Portland himself. He promised to quit his job if he 
failed. As the campaign revealed that the owners of property where immoral 
activity could be found "came from the highest social and business levels in the 
city," public indignation increased. The city had also tied its financial fortunes 
to vice, gathering a substantial portion of its budget from granting liquor 
licenses. The issuance of 500 of these permits in 1900 provided half of city 
revenue for that year. Yet, despite public outrage, the Vice Commission seemed 
divided and powerless. It had become ''bogged down in the old dispute over 
whether the profession [of prostitution] should be banned or limited to a 
restricted district." Rushlight favored the latter option as ''better than present 
conditions," but felt that the Commission should not have the power to 
implement such a scheme.17 
The result of the exposure of vice corruption, and growing anger over 
17MacColl, 402-411, 13; Gloria E. Myers, A Municipal Mother: Portland's Lola Greene 
Baldwin, America's First Policewoman (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1995) 104. 
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the complicity of the city council in placing corporate interests above those of 
citizens in zoning and granting franchises brought about a revolution in 1913. 
The Galveston Plan was approved in May and instituted after the election of 
local officers the following month. According to this new charter, the part-time 
fifteen member city council would be replaced by four full-time commissioners, 
each in charge of a city department assigned to them by the mayor, who also 
would have charge of a department (intended to be the police). All five 
individuals would hold equal voting power, without veto, and each would be 
elected by the entire city through a non-partisan preferential voting system. In 
an effort to keep industry out of municipal administration, all citizen boards 
would be abolished. 18 
The city had, by only 722 votes, chosen a system that would dramatically 
reduce corporate cronyism and partisan brokering. Low voter turnout may well 
have been a decisive factor in the victory, caused in part by the decline of local 
party organization. However, Janik's research clarifies from which social 
groups support for the new charter came. In a study of voting records by 
precinct, he has concluded that the most substantial support came from the 
middle and laboring classes, with upper and lower class individuals alike 
registering less support. He indicated that while Progressive attempts at social 
control received most support from the upper classes, schemes to limit the 
power of special interests were most heavily supported by the middle and 
laboring classes. The latter groups continued their electoral success in 1913 
with the election of Progressive H. Russell Albee, advocate of "municipal 
18MacColl, 442. 
ownership of public utilities," to the office of mayor in a repudiation of both 
major parties.19 
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Albee's administration, like Rushlight's, would be plagued by the high 
profile of the vice problem in Portland. In 1913, the state legislature passed the 
'Abatement Law' championed by Governor West that would hold individual 
owners liable for immoral businesses on their property, even those carried out 
without their knowledge. In addition, because "common fame was sufficient 
evidence of guilt," the alleged immoral practices did not have to be proven with 
hard evidence. Penalties were harsh, and the District Attorney filed sixty-eight 
cases within eighteen months. The Albee administration hoped to build a 
detention facility to accommodate the "unfortunate women" streaming into the 
justice system, and appropriated $15,000 in the 1914 budget toward this end. 
Although the city did purchase a site, construction funds did not materialize 
until 1918, and only then as the result of federal pressure to protect nearby 
troops from venereal disease. In its ineffective anti-prostitution zeal, Portland 
was not alone. Boyer noted that although 102 cities engaged in thorough vice 
investigations between 1902 and 1916, it is not apparent that there was much 
long-term success in controlling the problem.20 
19MacColl, 444-445; Janik, 82, 86; MacColl, 445. 
20MacColl, 459-461; Myers, 124-125; Boyer, 195, 217-218. 
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New York was the first major American city to formally investigate the 
extent of its prostitution trade, creating a 'Committee of Fifteen' which 
published its shocking results in 1902 and became a model for other cities who 
would go on to pursue similar efforts. As the campaign swept American cities 
and inspired national coalitions, rhetoric reached increasingly fierce levels. 
Boyer noted that the moderately worded report of New York's 1902 
commission was followed by increasingly polemical ones from other cities and 
national groups. All three of Rodgers's languages of Progressivism seem to 
converge upon this issue. Boyer traced a shift in the anti-prostitution campaign 
from 'social purity' to 'social hygiene,' its rhetoric "suffused with public health 
terminology." Here, the language of the moral reformer, social unity, converged 
with that of the Progressive technocrat, social efficiency. The desire for tangible 
results to an enormous problem required language that could convey actual 
progress, hence moral reformers sought out technical experts and utilized their 
methods of operation and standards of measurement. Antimonopolism was 
also strongly present, for the crusade "displayed less interest in the nation's 
general level of sexual morality than in a limited phase of the subject: large-
scale commercial prostitution." According to New York's director of 
investigations for the Committee of Fifteen, George Kneeland, the prostitution 
trade was comprised of "whole networks of relations ... elaborated below the 
surface of society." The implication was clearly that prostitution was a shadowy 
trust to be exposed and broken up, rejuvenating urban morality.21 
Boyer has contended that to Progressive reformers 'saloon' and 'brothel' 
21Boyer, 103, 211, 199-201, 206, 209. 
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were often "simply code words for the larger menace of urban social change." 
The primary cause of urban immigration, rapid industrialization, played 
perhaps the greatest role in dramatically changing social and cultural life in 
America's urban centers. Portland's massive population growth and expansion 
of manufacturing enterprise over a single decade indicates an unprecedented 
level of geographic mobility and must have resulted in similarly new 
possibilities of urban anonymity. As women poured into the industrial sector 
for the first time, maintenance of traditional standards of morality in the face of 
this cataclysmic change received strong attention. From his studies of 
contemporary interviews with urban prostitutes, Boyer has found that "the lure 
of the city, the fascination of activity and glitter ... , the drive to achieve a higher 
living standard, the unwillingness to pass one's life in subservient, deferential 
roles" were the primary causal factors leading women into prostitution. He 
continually came across "spirited women who have chosen prostitution in 
preference to boring, demeaning, or otherwise intolerable situations." Although 
reformers referred to it as 'white slavery,' "many of the women themselves" 
described their entry into the occupation as "a liberating escape from 
bondage."22 
J.J. O'Connor, who worked for the San Francisco courts in 1913, told the 
press he believed that "the small wages paid girls are the basic reason for most 
of the girls that come to us from the dance halls, the resorts, and the streets." He 
recounted the typical case in which a girl would leave the repressive life of 
domestic service to work in the department stores. While earning only $4 to $6 
22Boyer, 210, 203-204. 
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per week there, and "surrounded by things they longed for," the drift to 
prostitution was common in such environments. The role of the sinister 
foreigner was often emphasized in luring these young women into a debauched 
life. Clifford Roe, a nationally known anti-prostitution crusader, concluded that 
"native-born women were at the mercy of the foreign pimp." Fully three-
quarters of white slaves "have been inveigled from our own farms, homes, 
towns, and cities; but it was the foreigner who taught the American this 
dastardly business." Frederick Grittner has found that the "country-girl-to-
white-slave" idea encapsulated anxieties surrounding the increasing 
geographic and economic mobility of women developing concurrently with the 
rapid ethnic transformation of urban life.23 
Importantly, Roe defined 'white slavery' as the procurement of women 
"with or without their consent" to serve as prostitutes. For examples of 
voluntary prostitution were rife. While the shop girls O'Connor cited were 
making less than $1 per day, the Portland Vice Commission found in 1912 that 
in some cases prostitutes were making at least $25 to $30 per day. Ruth Rosen 
noted that only 7.5% of over 6,000 prostitutes interviewed in a variety of studies 
throughout the Progressive era reported 'white slavery' as the cause of their 
entry into the occupation. Rosen has found that this causal myth served "to 
deflect attention away from the very real social and economic factors that led 
women into prostitution." But perhaps most importantly, she asserted that it 
"emphasized women's passivity" in the transformative process from pure to 
23Qregon journal, July 24, 1913, p. 2; Frederick K. Grittner, White Slavery: Myth, 
Ideology, and American Law (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990) 66-68. 
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prostitute. Yet, in confirmation of Boyer's research, Rosen emphasized that 
"most women chose to enter prostitution," and that their motivations were 
primarily economic.24 
Deep seeded fears of the moral chaos seemingly implicit in the social 
revolution brought on by industrial urban life spurred a nation-wide minimum 
wage movement to ensure that women would be able to support themselves 
and live in a moral fashion. Clergyman Edwin O'Hara, Chairman of the 
Industrial Welfare Commission of the State of Oregon (formed in 1913) clearly 
eliminated the prostitution problem as a motivation for the minimum wage 
investigations undertaken by his commission. Yet the very fact that O'Hara 
sought to eliminate low wages as a causal factor of prostitution indicated that 
the idea had a certain currency. In addition, the Commission emphasized 
immorality as a result of low standards of living. The first section of its 
concluding report outlined five reasons why the state had a responsibility to 
regulate this aspect of private life: economic evils, social evils, domestic evils, 
individual demoralization, and national weakness. O'Hara's defense of items 
two through four employed such phrases as: "the deterioration of public 
morals," "moral temptation," "disintegration of family ties," "growth of 
24Grittner, 67; Second Report of the Portland Vice Commission: On Certain Aspects of 
the Commercialization of Vice, August 1912, p. 65, Stanley Parr Archives and Records Center, 
Portland, Oregon; Ruth Rosen, The Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in America, 1900-1918 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) 133, 137, 145. 
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seemed to deny the connection between low wages and female immorality on 
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the grounds of political impracticality. He noted the failure of this tactic in 
every state where it had been overtly named as the leading motive for 
minimum wage legislation, dismissing it as "a gratuitous insult to ... thousands 
of underpaid women workers." O'Hara claimed that the image of "underpaid 
women workers ... denying themselves the necessities of life in order to lead 
lives of virtue" would serve as "a more substantial argument" to sway the 
public.25 
Yet on the matter of low wages leading to prostitution, O'Hara had to 
endure contemporaries who would not be silenced. Emma Goldman, a radical 
socialist and anarchist, wrote in 1910 that "the merciless Moloch of capitalism 
that fattens on underpaid labor" had driven "thousands of women and girls 
into prostitution." Yet, "naturally our reformers say nothing about this cause" 
although "they know it well enough." She raged that "it is much more 
profitable ... to pretend an outraged morality, than to go to the bottom of 
things." Goldman also referred to repressed sexuality as a causative factor of 
prostitution, in clear contradiction to the passivity and victimization inherent in 
the Progressivist concept of 'white slavery.' The much more moderate 
Progressive reformer Jane Addams wrote in 1912 that the recently released 
Chicago Vice Report indicated that prostitutes made over four times more than 
women in "honest work." She worried that, in addition to exceedingly low 
25Edwin V. O'Hara, A Living Wage by Legislation: The Oregon Experience (Salem, OR: 
State Printing Dept., 1916) xix-xx, iii-iv, xix-xx. 
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wages, the brutality of industrial life and its effect upon the family was also a 
strong causative factor. Women could not "proportion their hours of work and 
intervals of rest according to their strength" which meant that "the effort to 
obtain a livelihood fairly eclipses the very meaning of life itself."26 
Perhaps the period's most extensive legal brief on this issue was that of 
Louis Brandeis, whose landmark victory in Muller v. Oregon (1908) opened the 
floodgates to women's protective labor legislation. Brandeis successfully 
defended Oregon's law limiting women employees to a ten-hour day. 
Significantly, his brief made substantial reference to the negative effects of long 
hours upon morality by maintaining that "the effect of overwork on morals" 
was "closely related to the injury of heal th." Brandeis cited the testimony of a 
mule-spinner in a cotton mill who claimed to "have noticed that the hard, 
slavish overwork is driving those girls into the saloons, after they leave the 
mills evenings." He also referenced the writings of British social scientist 
Beatrice Webb, who maintained that contemporary industrial life revealed "the 
invariable coincidence of a low standard of regularity, sobriety, and morality, 
with the conditions to which women, under free competition, are exposed."27 
Both Brandeis and O'Hara implied that the state must now provide the 
steady paternal guidance lacking in contemporary society. Contemporary 
jurisprudence would side with them. In his decision in Muller v. Oregon, Justice 
Brewer stated: 
26Emrna Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays (New York: Mother Earth Publishing 
Association, 1910) 184, 190; Jane Addams, A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil (New York: 
Macmillan, 1912) 56-58. 
27Leon Stein and Philip Taft, introduction, Women in Industry, by Louis D. Brandeis 
and Josephine Goldmark (New York: Arno Press, 1969); Brandeis and Goldmark, 44-46. 
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That her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal 
functions - having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being 
of the race - justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as 
the passion of man. The limitations which this statute places upon her 
contractual powers ... are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also 
largely for the benefit of all. 
Inherent in such thinking was the notion that female participation in the 
industrial work force should be viewed as regular employment because women 
often were entering the manufacturing sector to sustain themselves or a family. 
O'Hara stressed that if his contemporaries did not recognize that women no 
longer viewed industrial occupations as 'pin money,' or purely transitional 
work, but as their primary means of sustenance, future consequences would be 
dire. It could no longer be assumed that individual men would care for women. 
Thus, the state was to take on such responsibility in a regulatory capacity. If 
not, basic feminine biological and social roles would crumble, rending the 
moral fabric of society.28 
Alice Kessler-Harris has noted that the investigations of such state 
commissions in the Progressive era were ''heavily reliant on language and 
imagery that reduced women to perpetual girlhood" and "included almost 
nothing beyond the barest sustenance." Most employers refused to believe that 
women required wages to support either themselves or a family on a long-term 
basis, for the concept of the living wage was explicitly male. Kessler-Harris has 
cautioned that this idea should be seen as a social, not theoretical economic, 
construct. "Because the living wage idealized a world in which men had the 
privilege of caring for women and children, it implicitly refused women that 
28()'Hara, 47, xx, iii-iv. 
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privilege." Yet, Kessler-Harris has found, women were a quarter of the 
industrial workforce in the beginning of the twentieth century. More than one-
third of working women lived independently of their families, and three-
quarters of those who lived at home contributed earnings to support their 
family. Although an entirely new wage idea was needed to reflect the social 
structure of industrial America, reformers were motivated by "a desire to 
protect the home, not from ... antagonism to the pitiable condition of those 
women who worked for wages." The earnings of working women, they 
believed, should not be "so generous as to tempt those in families to live 
outside them."29 
Trade unionists in this period displayed a similar hesitancy in adjusting 
to the social reality of contemporary industrial life. Although the number of 
women in the workforce doubled between 1890 and 1910 (from four to eight 
million), the organization of women in trade unions did not reflect this trend. 
Philip Foner cited Leo Wolman's estimate of 73,800 female trade unionists in 
1910, less than 1% of the total number in the workforce. Kessler-Harris has 
found a slightly higher percentage for that year (1.5%), but still equally 
negligible. Foner has written that although "year after year the A.F. of L. passed 
resolutions calling for the organization of women workers," their policies in this 
period reveal a great deal of ambivalence concerning such recruitment. When 
the women of Pontiac, lliinois engaged in the shoemaking industry expressed 
an interest in joining the Boot and Shoe Workers, they quickly became 
29Alice Kessler-Harris, A Woman's Wage: Historical Meanings and Social 
Consequences (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1990) 13, 7, 10-13. 
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disillusioned: "we voted by a large majority not to go in as the dues were to[ o] 
high, and we simply do not earn enough to pay them." Foner cited Brissenden's 
contemporary wage estimates of women workers, finding an annual average of 
$339 in 1909, compared with $631 for men. The AFL often appeared to be 
calling for the widespread organization of the working class, but dues of $1 to 
$5 per month and initiation fees ranging from $25 to $500 made union 
representation cost prohibitive for many workers.30 
Kessler-Harris has actually found a trend of declining trade union access 
for women at the turn of the century. The percentage of unionized women in 
industrial occupations declined from 3.3% in 1900to1.5% in 1910. Her research 
is confirmed by Foner's earlier work. Between 1903 and 1908, he has noted, the 
number of women trade unionists in Chicago declined from over thirty 
thousand to just ten thousand. Foner cited the disgust of women workers with 
the hostile attitude of AFL craft unions as perhaps the major cause of this 
decline. This contempt seems to have been mutual, for while some international 
unions declared their intent to organize women and to reduce their 
membership fees, many locals within these unions merely disregarded these 
directives. The notion that women entered industry only temporarily, and to 
earn spending money rather than a living wage, was pervasive among AFL 
leaders. They felt, therefore, that it would be a waste of resources to organize 
workers who would not play a long term role in trade unionism. The Women's 
Trade Union League, organized in 1903, attempted to overcome opposition to 
30philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Volume ill: The 
Policies and Practices of the American Federation of Labor, 1900-1909 (New York: International 
Publishers, 1964) 221-222; Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning 
Women in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 152; Foner, 221-222. 
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organizing women within the AFL, but the organization merely "greeted the 
new venture politely, and its leaders gave it lip-service support." At the tenth 
anniversary convention of the League in St. Louis during June 1913, provisions 
for training women organizers and making skilled craft training available were 
prominent concerns. However, Foner noted that although the League worked 
extensively to prepare women to enter the AFL, union locals often failed to 
follow-up with recruitment.31 
Victor Morris wrote, in 1930, that the unionization of women in Oregon 
was as scant as such efforts in the rest of the country. He found a number of 
reasons why, although "the organization of women into unions has been 
attempted," it has not met with success. He found women laborers to be 
younger, on average, than male laborers, which conspired with their entry into 
"industry in large numbers" as a "comparatively recent development" to 
render them more inexperienced as a group than their male counterparts. 
However, "a more fundamental reason for their weakness" was the temporary 
nature of their involvement in industrial work. In addition, he noted that 
organization requires "financial strength and women represent the very lowest 
paid groups." He also blamed concentration in unskilled lines of work and the 
opposition of employers.32 
However, Morris seemed fully aware of the need to sustain a living wage 
for women in industry. He asserted that although current participation in 
industrial life among women was often a precursor to married life, or a result of 
31Kessler-Harris, 152; Foner, 223-229; Portland Labor Press, June 16, 1913, p. 3; Foner, 230. 
32Victor P. Morris, Oregon's Experience with Minimum Wage Legislation (New York: 
AMS Press, 1968) 65-67. 
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desperate circumstances later in life, "this is probably a slowly disappearing 
characteristic and that as modem life develops more completely women will 
become permanent factors in the laboring class." He also believed that "most 
women are in industry by force of necessity; their jobs are vital to them." 
Maintaining, however, their inexperience and lack of financial resources and 
craft skills, Morris asserted that in the face of hostility from both the labor 
establishment and employers the state had been justified in entering the 
bargaining process on the side of women workers. Although organization 
among women might be a viable alternative in the future, the seriousness of 
"immediate conditions" called for other methods to "give improved bargaining 
strength to women." He indicated that "analysis of the process of bargaining 
through the Industrial Welfare Commission [of Oregon] shows that it 
overcomes these weaknesses inherent in unionization of women." "To the 
strength of women is added the strength of the state." Because women lack 
"initiative," "organizing ability," and "resisting power" due to their current 
state as an impoverished and unrepresented group within industry, the 
Industrial Welfare Commission was to become their active representative, 
initiating and fighting for improvements in their situation.33 
Although women in the fruit canning industry desperately required 
33Morris, 66-67, 70-71. 
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better wages and conditions, state intervention was minimal. This industry 
provided seasonal work, with June to October roughly comprising the period of 
highest employment in Oregon. The average number of laborers in the state 
varied widely according to the time of year, from 246 in March to 1,495 in 
October. Because of the urgency of preserving fruit before spoilage, these 
establishments were exempt from the state's maximum work hours legislation, 
the most common work week comprising fifty-four hours, but ranging up to 
seventy-two. Because the work offered long hours over a brief period in an 
unskilled job, many of those who chose it were women with family obligations, 
workers who presumably required a great deal of flexibility in their working 
life. In Oregon's fruit and vegetable canneries in 1914, over half the workforce 
was female. This was a recent trend; in the canning industry as a whole, the 
workforce had been 61%malein1909, reduced to just under 50% only five 
years later.34 
During the 1923 fruit picking and canning season in western Washington 
state, the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor conducted a thorough 
survey of females engaged in that industry. Their findings indicated, as David 
Montgomery asserted, that "a woman's wage earning was most often limited to 
the years before the birth of her first child." However, Montgomery also noted 
that the highest proportion ever of American women who never married was 
born between 1860 and 1900. These women would have been between nine and 
34Census of Manufactures, 1914 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919) 370-371; 
Women in the Fruit-Growing and Canning Industries in the State of Washington: A Study of Hours, 
Wages, and Conditions (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926) reprinted in Dan 
McCurry, ed., Cannery Captives: Women Workers in the Produce Processing Industry (New 
York: Amo Press, 1975) 35-36; Census of Manufactures, 366, 369. 
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forty-nine years old in 1914, a period when the Oregon canning industry seems 
to have been rapidly feminized. A decade later, in western Washington, that 
same generation (now between nineteen and fifty-nine) comprised over three-
quarters of the female component of the fruit cannery workforce. In clear 
confirmation of Montgomery's research, 40% had never married. In addition, 
17.2% of the cannery workforce was either widowed or divorced. It is clear that 
women of this generation required a living wage in order to survive.35 
Of the 2,591 women reporting in the 1923 Women's Bureau survey, 950 
described themselves as 'daughter' or 'sister' rather than 'wife' or 'mother.' Yet, 
almost three-quarters of the total number of women were twenty-five or older. 
Family ties, even among the unmarried, appear as a major causal factor of 
taking work. Not a few women had a great deal of responsibility for sustaining 
their families, 322 reporting that there were no male wage earners in their 
family (the greatest portion of these women, 183, worked in fruit canneries) and 
147 reporting that they were the sole wage earner of the family (the greatest 
number, 92, also at fruit canneries). Over half the total number of women 
surveyed "stated that they were working to help meet the expenses, or supply 
the necessities, of the home and family."36 
Yet, low wages, irregular hours, and appalling working conditions made 
cannery work a brutal and ineffective means of support. Of the eighteen 
canneries in western Washington that the Bureau inspected, only a quarter had 
35David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and 
American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 137, 141; 
McCurry, 22-23. 
36McCurry, 26, 22, 28. 
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wash basins with hot water and one-third did not provide towels. Only three 
factories boasted sanitary drinking fountains, and less than one-third of the 
canneries had a toilet for at least every twenty women (some only provided one 
for every thirty to sixty women employed). Although the Bureau stated that 
due to "the nature of cannery work, a dressing room in which to change 
clothing seems essential," they were often absent or combined with other 
facilities such as lunch rooms or bathroom and washing areas. Almost a third 
of the canneries surveyed failed to provide lunch rooms, and over half lacked 
rest rooms.37 
Only 10% of the women listed choice as the reason for seeking 
employment in the industry, specifically to "earn spending money" or for "the 
chance to work with their friends." That this number is so small is unsurprising, 
considering the grueling nature of the work. Montgomery suggested that "for 
wage-earning women, as for most teenage boys, work was most unlikely to 
become the central concern of their thoughts and dreams." A working life was a 
necessity for many in this generation of women who quite often were maritally 
unattached, with more than a few lacking male wage earners to rely upon. 
Nowhere within the fruit industry was this more true than in the canneries, 
where nearly half of the women in the Bureau survey that reported they 
worked to support themselves were employed. The fight within this industry 
for a living wage was clearly an issue of survival, but the seasonal and 
unskilled nature of the work exacerbated continuing doubts within the labor 
37McCurry, 99-100. 
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establishment concerning the organization of women.38 
38McCurry, 35; Montgomery, 143; McCurry, 28. 
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Just three days after the Industrial Welfare Commission of Oregon began 
an investigation of Portland factories to the end of establishing a minimum 
wage for women, a group of women workers participated in a spontaneous 
walkout at the Oregon Packing Company. Both the Morning Oregonian and the 
Oregon Journal, the morning and evening papers with the widest circulation in 
Portland, estimated that fifty women walked out of the fruit cannery on the 
morning of June 27. The Journal reported that the women involved in the 
protest were part of a work force 200 strong and had just begun work as cherry 
stemmers that morning. After three hours of work, some of the women had 
discovered that at the pay rate of 10~ per box of cherries stemmed and sorted, 
they were earning only between 5 and 8~ per hour. A group of forty pickers left 
their work to raise the matter with Superintendent McPherson, overseer of the 
plant. He refused to raise wages, instigating an immediate walkout by the 
group and ten women who joined them on their way out. The women called 
upon a local branch of the Socialist Party, who sent organizers over to the plant. 
The IWW quickly became aware of the strike and also sent help.1 
With the assistance of local socialists and Wobblies, the striking women 
immediately began a protest outside the main entrance to the plant, carrying 
banners and attempting to draw the rest of the women out. The Superintendent 
quickly raised the rate for cherries from 10 to 15~ per box. "They had to," one 
striker asserted, "or practically every one of the girls would have walked out." 
The Daily News, the only Portland newspaper of significant circulation to 
1Moming Oregonian, July 4, 1913, p. 16; June 30, 1913, p. 7; Oregon journal, June 30, 1913, 
p.2. 
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support the strikers, announced that "it is planned to start a union of the girls if 
possible." The paper attempted to arouse a sense of inevitability concerning the 
strike by exaggerating the size of the walkout and declaring that more were 
quitting every hour. Yet, there may well have been truth in the paper's assertion 
that "many others applying for work join the strikers when told of the 
conditions." To pass through the door to the plant, women who had no 
connection with the cannery would have had to pass through a gauntlet of 
angry strikers, radical organizers, and sympathizers. The typicality of Oregon 
Packing Company conditions and the rarity of significant strike action in such 
concerns may have instigated some amount of solidarity between the protestors 
and women seeking work. During the first several days of the strike, the action 
remained a spontaneous protest without formal representatives or demands 
beyond increased wages.2 
Nevertheless, organization quickly followed. The News reported that a 
woman who lived near the cannery offered both her home and telephone to the 
strikers for the establishment of a headquarters later in the day of the walkout. 
That evening, Tom Burns, an English immigrant and local radical of eclectic 
socialist views, delivered a street lecture in downtown Portland describing 
conditions at the cannery and proclaiming the existence of a strike. He collected 
$12.75, the beginning of a strike fund. On June 29, $82.60 was raised on behalf of 
the women by local socialists at a similar event, and although it is unclear 
whether or not Burns was present, he quickly emerged as the leader of a hastily 
formed strike committee. It is likely that his leadership emerged during a 
2/ournal, June 30, 1913, p. 2; Daily News, June 28, 1913, p. 1. 
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meeting held at the local Socialist hall on the evening of June 30, during which 
the News claimed "an effort will be made to organize the girls so that they can 
carry on their campaign more effectively." On July 1, although the packing 
company refused to negotiate with the strike committee, the police met with the 
group to clarify the parameters of the protest. Ominously, the strikers made a 
threat to fill the jails if 'free speech' was denied them.3 
In the wake of the meeting at the Socialist hall, formal demands were 
issued. Two of these demands, $1.50 per day for laborers and 25¢ per hour for 
forewomen, indicated the unusual nature of this strike. Women were grouping 
together in a way that belied traditional work hierarchies. Work conditions 
featured prominently. The women demanded a lunch room, sick room, 
dressing room, lockers, three aprons per worker per week, and sufficient 
towels. Current conditions were claimed to be intolerable, with five wash 
basins for the entire plant and lavatories that were "insufficient and 
unsanitary." J.D. Edmunds, whose identity and connection to the strike is 
unclear, wrote a lengthy description of plant conditions to Mayor Albee on July 
6. He asserted that if the women complained about their wages they are "lered 
at and will be answered that; you are a good looker; and can do business on the 
side and make a good living- all the girls do that." Edmunds also maintained 
that women were fired for taking leave during menstruation and fined 25¢ for 
eating a piece of fruit. He noted that the toilets were "dirty unsanitary hovels 
not fit for a hog," forcing the women to use toilets in private residences near the 
plant, and that the towels and sinks were "positively filthy." Although the 
3News, June 28, 1913, p. 1; June 30, 1913, p. 1; July 2, 1913, p. 1. 
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mainstream press continually stressed the wage aspect of the strike, conditions 
in the plant were clearly a crucial factor in the walkout. In addition, the women 
demanded a nine-hour day (the plant was operating on a ten and one-half hour 
day), duplicate time slips, and a promise that strikers would not be 
discriminated against after settling their grievances with the company.4 
The Industrial Welfare Commission quickly became involved in the 
dispute on behalf of the striking women, but the manner of their initial 
involvement is unclear. While the Journal claimed that a delegation of strikers 
called upon Chairman O'Hara and the Commission on June 30, only four days 
into the protest, the News reported that the strike committee found their 
interference entirely unwelcome. Burns stated that "the Industrial Commission 
which butted into this affair is composed mostly of parlor reformers, and it 
seems to me that their principal function is to break a strike and not assist in 
ameliorating the conditions of the helpless workers." J.D. Edmunds confirmed 
Burns's reaction, asking in his letter to the Mayor: "is it not the strikers place to 
ask for a living wage, and make there own agreement with the company[?]" On 
July 1, the day after the delegation of strikers reportedly called upon the 
Commission, a three hour inspection took place after which RD. Fontana, plant 
manager, agreed to a payment system of $1 per day minimum and extra for all 
piece work above the value of $1 at 15¢ per box. The Journal confidently 
reported that "with this new rate in effect it is believed that all of the women 
and girls who walked out will go back." In addition, Fontana promised to 
4News, July 2, 1913, p. 1; July 12, 1913, p. 1; J.D. Edmunds, letter to HR Albee, July 6, 
1913, Mayor's Subject Correspondence, Stanley Parr Archives and Records Center, Portland, 
Oregon; journal, June 30, 1913, p. 2; News, July 2, 1913, p. 1. 
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improve restrooms and conveniences. The shorter day, however, was rejected 
out of hand. At the beginning of the strike, Superintendent McPherson pleaded 
the company's financial position to the press, stating that "this business is at 
present making little or no money." He justified the low wages, also, with his 
belief that "virtually every woman working as a picker does not have to work 
for her support. Many of them are girls who want to make some extra pin 
money."5 
The Commission stressed that the agreement, although not ideal, "offers 
immediate relief" whereas legal action could not be initiated and concluded 
within the current fruit packing season. They also noted that the improvement 
in wages was "notable" and other factories were only paying between $3.50-
$4.50 per week, making $6 "not unreasonable comparatively." The Commission 
hypothesized that too high of a minimum would prevent the hiring of any 
women other than those of very high efficiency, barring aged or infirm women 
from the industry (although they had actually negotiated to let a certain 
number of such women work as exemptions from the minimum). Still refusing 
to meet with the strike committee, Fontana selected a business associate, H.M. 
Haller, to act as intermediary in presenting the compromise to the strike 
committee. The strikers rejected the agreement, in which they had not 
participated and which ignored or failed to meet virtually all of their demands. 
The immediately negative reaction of the strikers to the inspection and 
compromise discredits the frivolous motivations for working ascribed to the 
5journal, June 30, 1913, p. 2; News, July 4, p. 1; Edmunds to Albee, July 6, 1913; journal, 
July 1, 1913, p. 2; Oregonian, July 4, 1913, p. 16; journal, June 30, 1913, p. 2. 
women by Fontana. The Journal's claim that the women themselves had 
solicited the help of the Commission is also thrown into question.6 
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This indication that the strike had the potential to become a protracted 
conflict spurred the Mayor to take a firm position regarding methods of public 
protest. The strikers were contending with a new administration, the first under 
the new city charter, which had just taken office on July 1. The News declared 
that "a decided change was noticeable in the attitude of the police authorities," 
portending confrontation. Handling the strike would be the first serious test of 
the viability of the city's new organization and Progressive administration to 
maintain order and judge grievances in the context of public opinion. On July 2, 
the Mayor laid out his guidelines. "There will be no bar to free speech in the 
streets as long as I am mayor, and that is positive." However, "what I do object 
to and will not permit is the nasty and insulting language that some of the street 
speakers in the city have been resorting to." The theme of enforcing a 
community standard of obscenity would resound throughout the conflict. He 
also defended the right to picket and emphasized the importance of street 
speaking "to people of the working classes who cannot afford to hire halls to 
speak in." The following day, the Mayor made a visit, incognito, to the site of 
the strike after an anonymous phone call warned his office of unrest. Albee 
found the behavior of the crowd perfectly satisfactory, noting that "there were 
policemen on hand, but the strikers themselves were preserving order."7 
6/ournal, July 3, 1913, p. 2; July 1, 1913, p. 2; News, July 3, p. 1. 
7News, July 2, 1913, p. 1; journal, July 2, 1913, p. 23; July 3, 1913, p. 2. 
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However, the stakes were being raised as the protest continued to 
interfere with the smooth operation of the cannery. The News reported on July 
4, two days after the Mayor's visit, that local residents had been approached by 
representatives of the plant and asked to complain of unrest to police 
headquarters, and claimed that troublemakers had been placed in the crowd. 
J.D. Edmunds confirmed these accusations in his letter to the mayor. However, 
at this point, it seems the paper's accusations that plainclothesmen in the area 
were looking for any excuse to begin making arrests seems unfounded. But the 
following week, on July 8, the confrontation began a two day period of sharp 
escalation. In the morning, eleven women who had remained at work at the 
cannery were driven to the Mayor's office to claim abuse at the hands of the 
striking women. The tactic was soon discovered, and a large group of strikers 
and sympathizers marched from the plant to City Hall to present counter-
evidence. The number in the group remains unclear; the Oregonian estimated 
200, and the News 100, while the Journal claimed only fifty. It is clear, however, 
that Burns led the group and IWW and Socialist Party men were in attendance. 
After this second group of women arrived, the Mayor was forced to move the 
meeting from his office to the council chamber to accommodate the large 
numbers. Women who wished to testify concerning the conditions in the plant 
and the conduct of the strike were sworn in by City Attorney LaRoche. Both 
sides claimed they were receiving abuse from the other, and differed sharply in 
their descriptions of plant conditions.8 
Later in the afternoon, Superintendent McPherson arrived with a group 
of delegates (again, of indeterminate size; the Journal claimed fifty while the 
Oregonian noted only thirty) from the East Side Business Men's Club 
demanding action to quell the disturbance. It was now impossible to conceal 
the damage the strike had done to the company. McPherson and Fontana 
claimed that if the strike continued, business would have to be transferred to 
their plant in Salem at close of business on Saturday. They noted that 300 
women had been employed before the disturbance, but the female workforce 
had been reduced to 150. This indicates a total of 150 strikers, a number 
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confirmed by the News several days later. The plant managers tried to shift 
blame for the growth of the strike to the protestors themselves by reducing their 
estimate of the initial walkout to twenty, although both the Oregonian and the 
Journal had recorded fifty. The plant had clearly lost a great deal of money. The 
day before the conference in the council chamber, 200 boxes of cherries lay 
rotting at the entrance for lack of women to stem and sort them. On the 
morning the group of loyal workers was driven to the Mayor's office, five 
wagons full of fruit were hauled away from the plant unprocessed. Several 
days later, Superintendent Otis of the city crematory stated that his facility had 
burned fifteen tons of cherries in the past week, most of them delivered from 
the Oregon Packing Company. City Commissioner Daly arranged to have 
excess fruit sold in the streets to minimize waste and financial loss. Overall, the 
BNews, July 4, 1913, p. 1; Edmunds to Albee, July 6, 1913; News, July 4, 1914, p. 1; July 8, 
1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 9, 1913, p. 10; News, July 8, 1913, p. 1; journal, July 8, 1913, p. 15; 
Oregonian, July 9, 1913, p. 10. 
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company claimed $5,000 dollars had been lost so far.9 
Mayor Albee could certainly identify with the businessmen who called 
upon him that afternoon, for he had "entered the the lumber business in Bay 
City, Mich., as a young man and soon became owner of a manufacturing 
lumber plant." He arrived in Oregon in 1897 as Portland manager of the 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. Although he had been a 
member of the City Council from 1902 to 1905 and served in the State Senate in 
1909 and 1911 before becoming mayor, Albee had spent much more of his 
career in the business world than as an elected official. After the visit from the 
East Side Business Men's Club delegation, a significant shift of policy toward 
the disturbance is evident. Previously satisfied with the conduct of the strikers, 
Albee issued a statement that if any laws were broken arrests would be made, 
seemingly anticipating this outcome. Indeed, the day after the conference, the 
first arrests occurred. While picketing, Mary Schwab, wife of I.WW organizer 
Rudolph Schwab, was arrested twice (the News claimed four times) on 
disorderly conduct charges. Her husband and another sympathizer, Henry 
Schoen, were also arrested. For the Schwabs, this would be the beginning of a 
protracted legal battle. Mrs. Schwab's second arrest was instigated by an 
employee of the plant who had a warrant issued for her on the charge of using 
"violent and abusive language." The latter arrest would characterize those that 
followed. The following evening, July 10, Mayor Albee instructed Chief of 
Police Clark that strikers were no longer allowed to congregate in front of the 
9journal, July 8, 1913, p. 15; Oregonian, July 9, 1913, p. 10; News, July 10, 1913, p. l; 
Oregonian, July 9, 1913, p. 10; July 11, 1913, p. 1. 
plant and that the protest would have to be moved to a vacant lot one block 
away. In addition, all speaking in the lot would end at ten in the evening. 
However, it is quite possible that the police interpreted the statement Albee 
released after the conference as license to start making arrests and the Mayor 
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was thus reacting to a situation that had heightened legal implications. The first 
day of arrests had already been followed by a second, in which three women 
strikers were taken into custody, seemingly forcing the mayor to retract his 
former liberal policy concerning picketing and speaking. In addition, the IWW 
held a street meeting in the evening on the second day of arrests that lasted for 
quite some time, with spectators causing traffic congestion, requiring the police 
to break up the crowd. Frustrated, Albee stated that "I have given the strikers 
every possible opportunity to do the right thing, and they seem to be 
disregarding my instructions entirely."10 
Causing the Mayor even greater chagrin, Governor West decided to 
come to Portland to negotiate a settlement and inspect the protest. On.July 11, 
upon arriving at the vacant lot now occupied by the strikers and their 
sympathizers, West engaged Tom Bums, who was addressing the crowd, in an 
angry dialogue. Bums, apparently, had threatened that the strikers would close 
the plant down, a statement to which West seemed to take great exception. He 
mounted a tar barrel to shout Bums down, and then successfully offered to 
negotiate a settlement at City Hall the following morning if the strikers agreed 
lOAnonymous article, 'Mayors- Portland' Vertical File, Oregon Historical Society, 
Portland, Oregon; E. Kimbark MacColl, Merchants, Money and Power: The Portland 
Establishment, 1843-1913 (Portland, OR: Georgian Press, 1988) 448; Oregonian, July 9, 1913, p. 10; 
July 10, 1913, p. 11; News, July 10, 1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 10, 1913, p. 11; July 11, 1913, p. 12; 
Journal, July 10, 1913, p. 1. 
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to stop picketing until then. Seemingly at wits end, the Mayor struggled to 
appear in control of the strike. "I have given my last warning. If it is not heeded 
my next action will be to direct the Chief of Police to stop all speaking in the 
streets." The strikers had already made clear what their reaction to this policy 
would be.11 
The Journal reported that "never in the history of the city hall did such a 
crowd press into its council chamber. There was no room for chairs, standing 
room was at a premium." The most dramatic moments of the July 12 meeting 
concerned the Industrial Welfare Commission. Bums, still resentful of the 
body's interference, shouted allegations of its dishonesty, to which West and 
Chairman O'Hara both responded. West leapt upon the mahogany council 
table and, as he had done the day before, shouted Bums down. O'Hara 
defended his honesty and claimed that "I have preached that it is right to 
strike." Dr. Marie Equi, a physician and local leftist Progressive, made her first 
dramatic appearance in the press. Subsequently, due to her unconventionality 
and flair for the dramatic, she would eclipse Bums and the Schwabs in 
coverage. The Journal noted that she: 
insisted on standing on a chair and speaking, though the others called 
her down and said she had not before and was not now doing the 
striking girls any good. Dr . Equi said she was willing to shed her blood 
on the picket line and exhibited a large bruise on her shoulder made, she 
said, by a policeman's club. 
Although less dramatic than the confrontations provoked by Bums and Equi, a 
significant amount of testimony concerning wages and conditions was given at 
the conference. Mrs. Miller, an elderly striker, stated that "if it were not for the 
11/ournal, July 11, 1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 12, 1913, p. l; journal, July 11, 1913, p. l. 
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assistance given by the despised agitators, I couldn't eat. They paid my rent, 
kept my table going, and paid for my sick boy." Mrs. M.E. Daniels, the first to 
proffer charges against Mary Schwab, claimed that "if we could only be left 
alone, we would all be one big happy family" and that the insults of the strikers 
''have only fostered in me a spirit of loyalty for the company, and I intend to 
remain here until I am told to go by the company." Both sides spoke at length, 
as in the previous conference, but again, little was solved.12 
After the conference, Governor West issued a report summarizing the 
strikers demands and the action he would take regarding them. The primary 
demands, a nine-hour day at $1.50 wage, he deemed insoluble except by legal 
action. West stated that the sanitary conditions of the plant and the 
establishment of rest, dressing, lunch, and sick rooms for the employees would 
be "taken up with the proper authorities" and "investigated and settled." He 
demanded that duplicate time slips "should be granted without question." This 
activist governor had begun his career as messenger for a Portland bank after 
leaving school, and had been raised in a working-class family which had been 
"left practically destitute" after the hotel they were living in burned down 
when West was a boy. Thus, no stranger to poverty, and elected as a populist 
Democratic reformer in a Republican state, it is clear that West sympathized 
with the strikers while remaining pragmatically conciliatory to business 
interests. As in the Coos County deportations, he framed his crusade in legal 
terms, thus providing a cloak of electoral safety.13 
12/oumal, July 12, 1913, p. 1, 2; News, July 12, 1913, p. 1; journal, July 13, 1913, p. 4. 
13Qregonian, July 13, p. 2; Anonymous article, 'Oswald West' Vertical File, OHS. 
81 
Now that the Industrial Welfare Commission, the Mayor, and the 
Governor had all failed to produce a satisfactory settlement, the strikers and 
their IWW and socialist organizers would have to force a resolution on their 
own. In light of the company's threat to close the evening following the 
conference if the disturbance was left unresolved, the Mayor decided to limit 
the number of pickets permissible in front of the plant to between ten and 
twelve. Indignant, the strikers marched back to the plant after the conference, 
rather than the vacant lot, and 150 participated in an evening protest. The result 
of this action, in defense of the right of all striking women to picket, again 
precipitated police action based on a reactive mayoral statement. At twenty 
past five in the evening, after attempting to clear the area before the plant 
unsuccessfully, six mounted police officers charged the crowd of pickets, 
injuring three women and causing a great deal of panic and confusion. Several 
arrests for disorderly conduct were also made. The Oregonian downplayed the 
story, and stressed the fruitlessness of continuing the strike, for the "plant has 
now replaced the strikers" and "the rush of the canning season ends this week." 
The Journal, however, reported that "men and women trampled eachother to 
get out of the way of the horses," clearly uneasy about the action of the police 
despite expressing antagonism toward the strike, and its IWW collaborators in 
particular. The News was indignant, comparing the charging policemen to 
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Cossacks, and proclaiming a reign of legalized brutality against the innocent. 
Encouraged by the company's impending closure and publicity of police 
brutality, the Wobblies seized this opportunity the next day to demand that the 
J.M. Matchek Candy Company pay $1.50 per nine-hour day to its women 
employees or risk a similar walkout. Although the threatened strike never 
occurred, the owner was sufficiently concerned to forward the letter he had 
received from IWW Secretary Fred Vollemen to the Mayor.14 
As with the first arrests, police action once again transformed the 
conflict. Settlement of the strike demands immediately became subsidiary to 
establishing the right to publicize plant conditions and to allow all strikers to 
picket. The first challenge would come several days later, following the 
inconclusive trial on July 15 of Mary Schwab on four counts of "being 
disorderly and using abusive language" in a tense courtroom packed with 
supporters. Although several plant employees testified that Schwab had 
verbally abused them, she responded that she ''had never used such language 
toward anyone." After a day of hearing the case, the jury failed to reach a 
verdict. It was revealed during the trial that she was a native of Russia, and that 
her husband Rudolph was a paid organizer for the IWW, and the son of 
Michael Schwab, one of the anarchist martyrs of Haymarket Square.15 
140regonian, July 14, 1913, p. 2; journal, July 13, 1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 14, 1913, p. 2; 
journal, July 13, 1913, p. 1; News, July 14, 1913, p. l; Fred Vollemen, letter to J.M. Matchek, July 
13,1913,MSC,SP.ARC. 
15journal, July 15, 1913, p. 2; Oregonian, July 16, 1913, p. 12; The 'Haymarket Affair' was 
a violent incident supposedly directed by anarchists against police authoirty during a public 
protest connected to a local strike. The resulting climate of public fear caused the scapegoating 
of eight individuals with anarchist symapthies whose connection to the incident was only 
tenuous. One committed suicide, four were hung, and three (including Schwab's father) were 
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That evening, after the inconclusive trial, a four day free speech battle 
began between strikers and police. A street meeting downtown drew a large 
crowd and police presence to listen to speeches. This meeting marked the first 
involvement of County Sheriff Tom Word in local peacekeeping regarding the 
strike. While Burns was addressing the crowd, he reportedly ranted that "we'll 
fly the Socialist flag over one end of Tom Word's marble palace, the red flag of 
anarchy over the other end, and the IWW flag in the center." Immediately 
afterward, Burns was pulled off of the soap box from which he was speaking by 
a deputy sheriff in front of a crowd of several hundred. Following an 
established Wobbly technique, Rudolph Schwab then mounted the soap box to 
continue Burns' s speech and follow him to jail. This time, the Sheriff himself 
and five deputies pulled down the speaker. Schwab was followed by one of the 
strikers, Mrs. O'Connor, who was pulled down by a deputy and followed by 
seven more speakers who were all arrested, one after the other. During the 
arrests, reinforcements from the police station arrived to clear the streets. The 
patrol wagon with its ten prisoners left for the county jail to book them on 
charges of disturbing the peace and using "profane and indecent language."16 
A large portion of the crowd went in search of the prisoners, mistakenly 
setting off for police headquarters before re-routing to the jail. The Oregonian, 
now captivated by the dramatic Dr. Equi, claimed that she led the crowd to its 
destination and stormed in, punching a patrolman and night watchman in the 
face before being thrown "out onto the sidewalk where she landed on all 
fours." This event is impossible to verify, but seems an invention. Equi's 
16Qregonian, July 16, 1913, p. 1. 
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primary purpose in proceeding to the jail was to secure the release of Mrs. 
O'Connor, which she succeeded in doing, and to protest the behavior of the 
arresting officers. She claimed that she had been struck by an officer while 
trying to reach Mrs. O'Connor following her arrest, and displayed her bruises 
to officers at the jail. The nine remaining detainees were placed with the rest of 
the prison population initially, but were moved the next morning to a private 
cell on the top floor "as they insisted on breaking jail discipline by singing their 
socialistic songs," a traditional Wobbly tactic. Rudolph Schwab was kept in a 
private cell because he was "considered one of the chief troublemakers." It is 
unclear what sort of treatment the strikers received in jail, but if that of Tom 
Burns is indicative, they were handled quite roughly. "I was beaten in the face 
and kicked. I was slugged in the kidneys a dozen times while being taken to 
jail," he told the News.17 
The explosive events of the evening of July 15 threatened to transform a 
local conflict into a regional one. The strikers responded by holding a protest 
meeting outside the cannery during which three participants were arrested. 
The Journal claimed that 100 IWWs were coming north from San Francisco to 
help local agitators challenge the Mayor's new street speaking policy. 
Reportedly, they were working as railroad laborers to get as far as southern 
17Qregonian, July 16, 1913, p. 1; journal, July 16, 1913, p. 7; News, July 21 1913,, p. 1. 
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Oregon, and would then ''beat their way north." In an attempt to avert fears of 
invasion, Sheriff Word claimed that "if necessary, we will make Kelly Butte a 
'bull pen' and take care of 500 agitators there. This matter has got to be put to a 
stop quick, and we intend to do it." However, despite claims by the Oregonian 
that municipal and county authorities were cooperating closely, the Mayor 
exhibited the same thinly veiled antagonism toward the Sheriff's interference as 
he had to that of the Governor. Albee stated that: 
as regards the arrests last night, all, or nearly all, the men were arrested 
by Sheriff Word, and he was acting on his own initiative. There was 
positively no understanding between the sheriff's office and the city's 
police authorities, although the police had orders to act if it became 
necessary. 
Yet, only the News reported this portion of the Mayor's statement. The public 
perception that there was indeed close cooperation between municipal and 
county authorities quickly took hold, evidenced by its consistent recurrence in 
both newspaper reports and letters of congratulations to the mayor for his 
stand. H.J. Blessing, manager of Blessing Granite Company, wrote to Albee that 
"your work in harmony with the Sheriff's Office, especially appeals to me, as 
the former Administration was in constant conflict with the Sheriff and 
therefore accomplished nothing in a way of dealing with the vicious Element of 
the City."18 
Once again, the Mayor made a reactive policy shift toward the strike in 
light of the escalation initiated by the Sheriff. Although he had promised to 
protect free speech, Albee announced on July 16 that all street meetings other 
18journal, July 16, 1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 16, 1913, p. 1; News, July 16, 1913, p. l; H.J. 
Blessing, letter to H.R. Albee, August 8, 1913, MSC, SPARC. 
than religious ones would be held only on the centrally located Plaza block, a 
public space across from the downtown courthouse. He warned that even this 
space would be denied to speakers if another riotous incident occurred. This 
rather moderate reaction, however, was reported as a "war to the finish upon 
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the Industrial Workers of the World ... declared by Sheriff Word, Mayor Albee, 
and Chief of Police Clark." The statements supposedly made by Tom Bums, 
reported by the Oregonian as the cause of his arrest, appear to be as fabricated as 
the concerted anti-Wobbly war launched by municipal and county authorities. 
Burns was not known to be ideologically orthodox, making his threat to put the 
flags of three distinct philosophies (socialism, anarchism, and syndicalism) on 
top of 'Tom Word's' courthouse (who had previously not been involved in the 
strike) rather out of character. Steward Holbrook, a friend of Tom Burns, 
remembered that he "usually described himself as a Socialist. The label is not 
quite accurate. He was more the eclectic." In addition to a denial by the News 
that the inflammatory statement had been uttered, it seems unlikely that 
Rudolph Schwab would have been singled out as the chief instigator among 
those arrested if Burns had voiced such a threat. Schwab, although more 
formally affiliated with the Wobblies, was junior to Burns on the strike 
committee and did not instigate a string of ten arrests. The Journal actually 
attributed a variation of Burns's supposed remarks to another speaker entirely! 
Clearly, the mainstream press processed the events of the previous evening to 
make this conflict fit the mold of previous Wobbly struggles.19 
19Qregonian, July 16, 1913, p. 1; journal, July 16, 1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 16, p. 1; 
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Although the threatened 100 Wobblies from San Francisco never 
emerged, the mainstream press, goaded by the strikers themselves, stressed the 
imminence of an invasion by radical agitators. A meeting in the Plaza square on 
July 16 drew a huge crowd (estimated at 2,500 by the Journal) to witness the 
spectacle that had caused ten arrests the previous evening. The crowd had been 
expecting the strikers to return to the downtown comer they had previously 
used, but they merely marched by this spot and told the expectant crowd to go 
to the Plaza block. Although several individuals attempted to start their own 
meetings outside the proscribed area, they were prevented from doing so by the 
police, and the evening saw little tumult. The speeches "were well within the 
bounds prescribed by the city officials." However, the strikers were clearly in a 
weak position by the evening of July 16 with all three members of the strike 
committee in jail. Schwab and Bums had been arrested the previous evening, 
and McDonald had been arrested at the plant that morning. There were no 
longer any unexplored channels through which to negotiate. In addition, the 
arrests of that morning and the previous evening had demonstrated that the 
downtown streets and the plant itself were clearly off limits. In desperation, the 
speakers threatened repeatedly on the evening of the July 16 to flood the town 
with reinforcements for their campaign if their demands were not met.20 
The reaction of police authorities was immediate and exhibited a 
genuine fear of invasion. On July 17, the Journal reported that "steps are now 
being taken by the authorities to drive all vagrants from the north end." Shortly 
20Qregonian, July 17, 1913, p. 12; journal, July 17, 1913, p. 11; Oregonian, July 17, 1913, p. 
12; journal, July 17, 1913, p. 11. 
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before noon, ominously, three IWW delegates went to the Mayor's office "to 
clarify the street speaking situation." That evening the climax of the strike took 
place on a downtown street comer forbidden to speakers. Insisting on 
presenting their case, and without the IWW and socialist strike leaders, a 
delegation of striking women organized their own protest aimed at informing 
the public of the facts concerning the strike. Ten minutes after the group of 
women arrived on the comer, accompanied by Mary Schwab and Dr. Marie 
Equi, county and municipal authorities attempted to clear the crowd of 3,000 
that had gathered to hear them speak. Complete chaos ensued and many 
bystanders were clubbed while trying to move out of the way of police. One 
witness told the News that "mounted police rode into crowds of men, women, 
and children and blackjacked them piteously without warning." The Journal 
attempted to lend a sense of inevitability to the police beatings with the 
explanation that "soon after the disturbance started it was impossible to 
distinguish reputable citizens from the agitators and this was the cause of many 
being struck by the police." The paper clearly ignored the fact that the 
'agitators' in question were an orderly group of women strikers who were 
attempting to set up a speaking stand on a forbidden comer. The officers were 
using violence to disperse the crowd, not subdue the speakers. The police were 
obviously ready for a strong show of force, having been warned by that day's 
edition of the News that 100 striking women would present their case that 
evening downtown. Word was accompanied by thirty deputies, and two police 
sergeants with twelve men were present. Immediately after the officers began 
clearing the crowd, two police captains with forty-two men, a sergeant with 
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twelve men, and a squad of nine mounted police arrived. By the time the police 
reached the group of women, only seventeen remained. All were arrested, 
although they had not even finished setting up their speaking stand, and taken 
to police headquarters to be processed. While being taken from the station to 
the jail, Dr. Equi stabbed a patrolman in the wrist with a hatpin. She was 
charged with disorderly conduct, inciting a riot, carrying a concealed weapon, 
and assault with a dangerous weapon. Mary Schwab was charged with inciting 
a riot and disorderly conduct. Three other women were charged with inciting 
riot. The rest were charged with disorderly conduct. All were released on bail 
except Equi, Schwab, and O'Connor. 21 
On the morning following her arrest, three friends of Dr. Equi called 
upon Sheriff Word and promised to remove her from the state if she were 
released and charges dropped. After being taken to the train station and 
discovering she was to be sent to San Francisco, Equi refused to leave and was 
returned to the county jail. "Honestly, now, did anyone imagine for a moment 
that I was a quitter? I'm here to see this thing through and I won't run." The 
Sheriff claimed that if she was judged to be sane he would press the charges. 
Equi refused to post bail and also refused to eat prison food (she had her own 
brought in). The Oregonian explained her behavior by continuing to portray 
Equi as dangerously insane. The previous evening she had supposedly "swung 
a wicked looking section of gaspipe" (that it was part of the speaking stand she 
was setting up was ignored in the report) "and screamed that she would kill 
21journal, July 17, 1913, p. 1, 11; July 19, 1913, p. 5; July 18, 1913, p. 6; News, July 19, 1913, 
p. l; journal, July 18, 1913, p. 6; News, July 17, 1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 18, 1913, p. 1, 5; journal, 
July 18, 1913, p. 6. 
90 
anyone who tried to make her stop talking" (although no speaking had yet 
occurred). Supposedly, the afternoon prior to the street meeting, she had told 
an Oregonian reporter that she intended to "prepare a virus in which she would 
dip a pin, a stab from which would cause a slow, lingering death." The survival 
of Patrolman Evans attests to the falsity of this statement.22 
On July 18, the Oregonian reported that "indications that white slavers, 
working boldly under the guise of Industrial Workers of the World and their 
sympathizers have established a recruiting station among the young girls in the 
IWW picket line." The paper also asserted that "IWW agitators, many of them 
rough men from the North End sections, mingle freely with these girls, talk 
\ 
with them, ... and in general affect close intimacy." Sergeant Harms claimed 
that "he never saw conditions more made to order for leading young girls 
astray than those that exist before the fruit company." A "flashily dressed 
woman" was seen mingling with the girls, and attempting to lure them away. 
Yet at no time was evidence presented that sexual immorality of any kind had 
been caused by the strike coalition of men and women. Mary Schwab told the 
News that the story was a complete falsehood and that the supposedly 'flashily 
dressed woman' was a striker who wore a black velvet dress she had bought 
five years before and now ''has a few patches on it, and is pretty well wom."23 
That same day, Chief Clark and Sheriff Word "issued orders ... to arrest 
all I.W.W. leaders their officers encounter and charge them with vagrancy." The 
News reported a few days later that this policy had resulted in a number of 
22joumal, July 19, 1913, p. 1, 5; Oregonian, July 18, p. 1. 
23Qregonian, July 18, 1913, p. 5; News, July 19, 1913, p. 1. 
arrests of individuals completely unconnected with the Wobblies. The paper 
asserted that all those out of work, or with less than $10 cash, or who could be 
goaded into making disparaging comments about local authorities, were 
arrested. John Jeffreys, attorney to the strikers, suggested that "workingmen ... 
keep their own counsel and refuse to talk to these chaps until this epidemic of 
arresting inoffensive people is at an end." The records of Detectives Goltz and 
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Royle for the July 18 find them "around town looking for idlers and vagrants 
also vagging l.W.W.'s." The Journal reported that Immigration Inspector 
Barbour and Assistant City Attorney Stadter would also be pursuing the 
possibility of deporting alien radicals involved in the strike. Tom Burns, having 
just been sentenced to forty days on the rock pile, was discovered by Sheriff 
Word to be a British national and possible army deserter who potentially could 
be deported.24 
Despite this thorough campaign to prevent a protest response to the 
arrests of the previous evening, a crowd of 1,000 gathered at the Plaza block on 
July 18 to listen to Isaac McBride (son-in-law of U.S. Senator Harry Lane), Mary 
Schwab, and socialist George Reece. The previous day, anxious to protect the 
monument to the Second Oregon on the Plaza block, the United Spanish War 
Veterans asked Sheriff Word to swear them in as deputies and he promised he 
would do so if the situation continued to escalate. Regardless, the veterans 
decided to deploy a presence of sixteen to protect the monument "to see that it 
was not desecrated." The veterans did not see action, but during the third 
24journal, July 18, 1913, p. 1; News, July 21, 1913, p. 1; July 23, 1913, p. l; Detectives Goltz 
and Royle, July 18, Investigative Record Books, SPARC; journal, July 18, 1913, p. l; Oregonian, 
July 19, 1913, p. 4. 
speaker's talk, Sheriff Word moved in and arrested him. The manner of the 
arrest caused quite a disturbance, precipitating other arrests and a forceful 
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attempt to halt the expansion of the crowd into surrounding streets. James 
Gregory, a bystander, was seriously wounded by Sheriff Word, who hit him in 
the face with a blunt object after the man had fallen to the ground. His cheek 
was gashed open and several of his teeth loosened. Although the Oregonian 
reported that he had attacked the Sheriff, the News rejected this report after 
contacting his attorney to obtain the full story. A man who had witnessed the 
unprovoked attack complained immediately to the Sheriff and was arrested, as 
was Gregory. The following evening, an uneventful meeting was held on the 
Plaza block during which Isaac McBride again spoke. Presumably, if the Sheriff 
had not begun mailing arrests the previous evening, the evening of July 18 
would have progressed to a peaceful conclusion much as that of July 19 did.25 
On July 20, the Journal reported confidently that "with most of the 
agitators in jail, the disturbances ... seem to be nearly at an end." Sheriff Word 
shared the paper's optimism, stating that "I do not believe that the agitators 
will continue to make trouble, as they seem to realize its futility." However, the 
'vagging' campaign continued with twenty-eight more men taken into custody. 
250regonian, July 19, 1913, p. l; July 18, 1913, p. 1; July 19, 1913, p. 1; News, July 19, 1913, 
p. 1; Oregonian, July 19, p. 1; News, July 19, p. l; journal, July 20, 1913, p. 1. 
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In addition, on July 23, Albee attempted to effect his only proactive policy shift 
of the entire affair by introducing a measure into a city commission meeting 
titled "an ordinance making it unlawful to insult or degrade the flag of the 
United States or to incite disorder within the City of Portland, prescribing 
penalties for violations thereof, and declaring an emergency." Commissioner 
Brewster thought the measure too strong, and referred it back to the Mayor for 
further consideration. It was never resubmitted. Brewster told the press that 
"true respect for the flag cannot be brought about by law and any attempt to 
force a feeling which does not exist will produce more bitter feeling and greater 
hostility." The Journal editorialized that "nobody challenges the advisability of 
passing a restrictive measure," but that the idea of criminalizing comments 
critical of the government was against the spirit of the American Revolution 
and would have hindered the exposure of corruption in past municipal 
administrations. Infraction of the ordinance carried the rather extreme penalty 
of one year in prison and a $500 fine. Albee, who appeared quite moderate 
throughout the conflict, had suddenly positioned himself quite precariously.26 
A Free Speech League was formed in the wake of a meeting in the Gypsy 
Smith Tabernacle on July 26, attended by 5,000, to protest the Mayor's 
ordinance and the violent behavior of Sheriff Word, and to instigate a recall 
movement to remove both officials. Commissioner Brewster was commended 
for his stand against the Mayor. Another meeting in the same location was held 
the following weekend, on August 2, but attendance declined. Although the 
26journal, July 20, 1913, p. 1, 5; City Council Record for July 23, 1913, Council 
Proceedings, SP ARC; Oregonian, July 24, 1913, p. 16; journal, July 24, 1913, p. 8; Oregonian, July 
23, 1913, p. 9. 
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News attempted to portray solid support for the recall movements, one of the 
most important speakers, Seneca Fouts, wrote Albee a letter after reading in the 
Oregonian, to his dismay, that he had called for the Mayor's removal. Fouts 
portrayed his talk concerning 'free speech' as one focused on the reciprocal 
duties "I considered the citizens owed to the country and our governmental 
authorities owed to the people." He protested that his language was not 
indecent or unpatriotic. He assured the Mayor that he did not support a recall 
movement, although the policy he had followed during the strike was "ill-
advised."27 
Although it is unclear at what point picketing at the cannery ceased, the 
Mayor reported that "there is no longer even the pretense of a strike at the 
plant" after visiting the site on July 18, the morning after Dr. Equi and the 
women strikers were arrested downtown. However, the News did not concede 
the strike until August 1, the day Albee announced his new street speaking 
policy. The Mayor now insisted that the congested area of the downtown and 
all street car intersections be kept free of public meetings in order to keep the 
peace and allow free flow of traffic. He also had just made a statement 
proclaiming his proposed municipal ordinance to be redundant, for there was 
already a state law in place to prevent "the use of language tending to incite 
disrespect for the American flag." The matter appeared settled, for on August 6, 
at a rather small meeting on the Plaza block, Rudolph Schwab was arrested by 
Sheriff Word. No protest followed his arrest, although thirty "free speech 
27News, July 29, 1913, p. l; July 28, 1913, p. 1; August 4, 1913, p. 1; Seneca Fouts, letter to 
H.R. Albee, August 4, 1913, MSC, SP ARC. 
prisoners" had recently been released by City Attorney LaRoche and the News 
reported that only three convictions had been obtained from 100 arrests and 
those three were appealing.28 
Yet radical street speakers did not disappear. On October 2, the Mayor 
received a letter from Benjamin Brick, a Juvenile Probation Officer, who 
lamented the ease with which crowds gathered downtown in anticipation of 
'free speech' agitators despite a significant police presence. Why could the 
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police not clear the crowds before the speakers arrived, he queried, thus halting 
a meeting before it could begin? The Mayor replied that "the orders have been 
given to do as requested in your letter; that is, keep the street clear before the 
need occurs, but the fact is ... that five seconds appears to be enough to draw a 
large crowd at a given point during these disturbances." The battle for 'free 
speech' appeared to be a conflict neither side could win.29 
280regonian, July 19, 1913, p. 8; News, August 1, 1913, p. 1; journal, August 1, 1913, p. l; 
Oregonian, July 31, 1913, p. 11; August 6, 1913, p. 4; News, August 1, 1913, p. l. 
29Benjam.in Brick, letter to HR Albee, October 2, 1913, MSC, SPARC; H.R Albee, letter 
to Benjamin Brick, November 6, 1913, MSC, SP ARC. 
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In order to form a more complete understanding of opposition to the 
IWW in western towns, a synthesis reflecting the typically diverse coalitions 
arrayed against them is needed. Robert Johnston's recent dissertation on the 
lower middle-class in Progressive era Portland described a shared political 
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vision among working and middle-class activists. Johnston's work drew upon 
the findings of Herbert Gutman, who uncovered extensive cooperation between 
working and middle-class individuals in the late nineteenth century to battle 
corporate enterprise foreign to their communities. Yet, Johnston argued, "what 
could have become one of the most significant problems in labor history's 
intellectual agenda" was completely ignored by the many scholars who have 
built upon Gutman's invaluable work. A path forward, Johnston suggested, 
necessitates an "integrated history of class relations" that recounts middle-class 
activism in an inter-class context, rather than continuing to engage in "the 
arbitrary separation of the histories of the working class and the middle class." 
The events and language of the Oregon Packing Company strike can be utilized 
to build upon this idea.1 
One significant aspect of the strike is the total absence of local affiliates of 
the AFL and coverage in the newspaper targeted to their membership, the 
Portland Labor Press. Although the Wobblies and radical socialists would surely 
have repudiated AFL assistance, the striking women themselves (aided by the 
Daily News) issued a plea for help to every labor union in the city on July 8, the 
day that the company brought its case to the Mayor with the support of the East 
lRobert D. Johnston, "Middle-Class Political Ideology in a Corporate Society: The 
Persistence of Small-Propertied Radicalism in Portland, Oregon, 1883-1926," Ph.D. dissertation, 
Rutgers University, 1993, 25-26. 
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Side Business Men's Association. The strikers, seeking similarly solid backing, 
received none. This result should have been unsurprising, for the Wobblies had 
brought the enmity of skilled labor in Portland upon themselves since their first 
appearance there in 1907. The I.WW lumber mill strike that spring closed almost 
every operation in the city in under a week and brought over 1,800 men into 
Portland Local 319. The union demanded a nine-hour day at $2.50 per man. 
These tactics bore strong resemblance to that of any national union, and in 
themselves did not depart significantly from the AFL tradition.2 
The cooperation between the AFL Central Labor Council and the mill 
owners to successfully defeat the Wobbly strike could be ascribed to an 
economic struggle between the two groups, capital and skilled labor, to 
establish a balance of power in the Pacific Northwest. The lumber industry was 
unorganized, yet dominated the regional economy. Dubofsky indicated that the 
Portland strike was the first major attempt of an outside organization to broach 
this detente, and initiated a discemable shift in industrial relations in the 
region. He cited Will Ames of the Puget Mill Company asserting after the strike 
that it would ''be well for the company to do everything in its power to have 
things pleasant for the men ... The days of the cabins and the man with the 
blankets is over." Organized labor and industry were adamant about making 
an immediate stand against the Wobblies, even if a certain amount of internal 
compromise was required.3 
Yet the AFL was not cooperating with the mill owners merely to repel an 
2Daily News, July 8, 1913, p. 1; Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the 
Industrial Worker of the World (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988) 129. 
3Dubofsky, 130-131. 
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invader into its sphere of economic hegemony. Although Dubofsky emphasized 
that strike leaders "mentioned revolution only as a future possibility, never as 
an imminent prospect," ideology was hardly invisible or irrelevant in the 
continuing antagonism between Wobblies and the labor establishment in 
Portland. The very concept of syndicalism was as abhorrent to mainstream 
organized labor as it was to Portland lumber barons. The Portland Labor Press 
praised Brooks's vitriolic indictment of syndicalism in a book review published 
several days into the Oregon Packing Company strike. The Labor Press raged 
that "syndicalism is a reversion to primitive, barbaric methods" and ''has 
flourished most where there is least knowledge of what Americanism is." In the 
wake of the strike, the Independent Longshoreman's Association was desperate 
to quell rumors of radical sympathies and held a special meeting to pass a 
unanimous resolution condemning the I.WW, repudiating its philosophy and 
methods, and barring any Wobbly from membership. Their oath of loyalty was 
amended to reflect this resolution, which was delivered to the Mayor. In late 
August, the Mayor received a similar resolution from the Pleasant Valley 
Grange. The organization affirmed that it was ''living today under the most 
liberal and enlightened government ever enjoyed by a people" and that the 
Wobblies were rightly being repressed by municipal and county authorities 
because they had unjustly degraded the Constitution and the flag, which the 
members of the Grange considered to be "the insignia of ideal liberty."4 
There is ample evidence that during the conflict individuals affiliated 
4Dubofsky, 130; Portland Labor Press, June 30, 1913, p. 1; A.F. Schaab, letter to H.R. 
Albee, August 14, 1913, Mayor's Subject Correspondence, Stanley Parr Archives and Records 
Center, Portland, Oregon; Pleasant Valley Items, August 23, 1913, MSC, SP ARC. 
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with the labor or socialist mainstream overtly avoided implication with the 
Wobblies. On July 18, when the free speech conflict that emerged out of the 
strike was at its peak, a committee representing a local organization of 
moderate socialists called upon the Mayor. The group wanted to hold a 
meeting downtown, and decided to go through formal channels to obtain 
permission. The Mayor denied their request to use the streets, but "appealed to 
them as citizens not do so and to aid the police in enforcing order." The 
purpose of their proposed meeting is unclear, but the most prominent among 
them, Isaac McBride, was the only speaker at a peaceful meeting on the Plaza 
block during the evening of July 19, in which "he dwelt at some length upon 
the foolishness of mob rule and urged his auditors not to take part in any riot 
which might start following an arrest." On July 22, the Oregonian reported that 
Sheriff Word had received numerous requests from workers to be sworn in as 
deputies, all of them claiming that "they regard the Industrial Workers of the 
World as enemies of organized labor." On July 30, Mayor Albee told the press 
that he was "much pleased with the wisdom displayed by labor," for "thus far 
the sober, thinking laboring men and women, both organized and unorganized, 
have stood by right principles and have refused to be misled."5 
The commentary of the Labor Press reiterates the Mayor's perception of 
the position of mainstream labor regarding the strike. "If starvation haunts the 
girls and women in Portland while they work from early morning to late at 
night," the paper editorialized, "now is not the time to play cheap politics and 
5Morning Oregonian, July 19, 1913, p. 8; Oregon journal, July 20, 1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 
22, 1913, p. 4; July 31, 1913, p. 11. 
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fuss on the street." The Labor Press seemed to be gloating over the impending 
failure of Wobbly leadership of the strike, and caricatured their tactics as 
childish and irresponsible. References to "schoolboy pyrotechnics" and "insane 
quarrelling over shadows" and their result, introducing "desolation and 
disaster into the life of the community," reveal an antagonism toward the IWW 
deeper than tactical divisions. Although the labor establishment had neglected 
to aid the strikers, the Labor Press became indignant over the fact that "people 
seem to have forgotten the cries for food which went up when girls and women 
were ready to accept charity to prevent death from starvation." On July 28, the 
paper endorsed Mayor Albee's opinion that picketing was fruitless and that the 
strikers would be better off negotiating through the Industrial Welfare 
Commission.6 
The labor establishment, however, was not merely kowtowing to 
municipal authorities and the business community to protect their growing 
influence and membership. A Progressivist ethos crossed traditional class lines 
and often made these groups allies in reform, even if motivations were 
disparate. Warren Blankenship has argued that support for Portland's new 
municipal charter crossed class lines, in contradiction to Samuel Hays, who 
supposed that the new system was championed by the urban elite. Blankenship 
maintained that although it is possible that the Progressive Party was used as a 
vehicle by an elite group that sought "to gain direct control over municipal 
government so that they could exercise their political control more effectively," 
Mayor Albee was not merely a tool of business interests. He noted that the 
6Labor Press, July 21, 1913, p. 4; July 28, 1913, p. 7. 
101 
founders had mainly remained the leaders of the local Progressive political 
faction and could not ''be construed by any stretch of the imagination to be 
representing an elite if that term is meant to include only the upper stratum of 
society in the social and economic sphere." It is crucial, Blankenship adds, that 
"it was they who sought Albee's candidacy, not he their support." The umbrella 
of Progressive politics was wide indeed.7 
Progressivism was more important as an idea than a political label. 
Although Albee won office in 1913, he garnered only 32% of the vote. The 
opponent he defeated in the primary ran as an independent, bringing the 
Progressive vote to 44%. Although certainly not a mandate, the vote is 
significant if one considers that less than 5% of voters were actually registered 
as Progressives. The appeal of the party as a temporary vehicle to establish 
honest government under the new charter and initiate social reform was both 
diverse and substantial. The Spectator opposed Albee's candidacy because it 
claimed he had the full support of two of its strongest opponents: the 
conservative Oregonian newspaper and the labor unions. As incongruous as this 
alliance may seem, it indicates the extent of shared values and genuine desire 
for rational cooperation between these two economic factions. The Progressive 
Business Men's Oub held an informal reception at the Oregon Hotel on 
December 16, 1913 in conjunction with the Multnomah Bar Association to give 
the two constituencies a chance to interact. Significantly, the two organizations 
invited all leading labor leaders to the event, so that members of all three 
7Warren M. Blankenship, "Progressives and the Progressive Party in Oregon, 1906-
1916," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1966, 236-238. 
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groups "may become better acquainted one with the other." The hosts "hoped 
that the result of the gathering" would ''be a closer relationship, a wider 
acquaintance and a better feeling between these men in this community." The 
Mayor was invited in order to lend "strength to the ameliorating and welding 
influence that we hope will be exerted."8 
The characterization of the AFL in Wobbly scholarship as sycophantic 
toward capital has grown out of a lack of emphasis on cultural values in 
economic conflict. Portland's business and labor establishments were actively 
formulating a balance of power, but both were clearly checked by community 
standards and shared values. In his study of Progressive era San Francisco 
organized labor, Michael Kazin noted that "proprietors of locally owned, long-
existing firms knew that labor's aims were popular in the general community." 
Significantly, Kazin emphasized that although businessmen often battled 
particular unions, they "usually defended the principle of unionism itself." 
Without a common cultural language, the two economic groups would have 
achieved a much more limited understanding of appropriate means of conflict 
resolution. The similarity of the language of rejection of PNW ideology and 
methods by both factions strongly indicates that the Wobblies had repudiated 
the cultural symbols, the 'Americanism,' used in these negotiations. The 
assertion that the AFL was elitist is substantial, but the idea that the union was 
sycophantic because it adhered to community standards of speech and behavior 
and attempted to form stable relationships with business interests by 
8Blankenship, 245, 240, 243; Arthur Langguth, letter to H.R. Albee, December 10, 1913, 
MSC, SPARC. 
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emphasizing cultural bonds between them is not substantiable. 9 
Since its very inception, the IWW served as a unifying idea among many 
labor radicals, including not a few who were unaffiliated with the organization 
but sympathetic to its aims. Not unlike the Progressivism of their opponents, a 
Wobbly 'sensibility' provided these individuals with a common language to 
express these aims and the means of reaching them. Perhaps the broadest and 
most resilient coalition of radicals that the IWW fostered during the course of a 
single action was, ironically, one that fought exclusively for civil liberties and 
ignored working-class organization. Yet, the San Diego 'free speech fight' of 
1911-12 marked "the most brutal and protracted anti-IWW activity" of the 
prewar years. This conflict was, in many ways, the climax of cultural tension 
between Wobblies and Progressives. The lack of any strike activity within the 
'free speech' struggle has allowed admiring historians of the Wobblies to claim 
it as a costly mistake from which much was learned and a desire to concentrate 
solely on organization reaffirmed. Detractors gained a defining example of the 
IWW engaging in agitation for its own sake while neglecting unionism, and 
claimed San Diego representative of Wobbly means and ends.10 
9Johnston, 121. 
10Narrative of San Diego conflict found in John Clendenin Townsend, Running the 
Gauntlet: Cultural Sources of Violence Against the !.W.W. (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1986) Chapters 2 & 3; Townsend, 17; The work of Philip Foner and Melvyn Dubofsky is 
representative of the first group of historians, and that of Robert Tyler is indicative of the latter. 
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The fight in Portland during the following year reveals the simplicity of 
both notions. Local adherents of the I.WW pushed the Oregon Packing 
Company to recognize the claims of its striking workers and hoped to unionize 
the women in the cannery. The letter from Fred Vollemen, I.WW Secretary in 
Portland, to the J.M. Matchek Candy Company also makes clear that the 
Wobblies hoped to unionize women in other local industrial concerns. They 
clearly realized the importance of public protest as a means to organization, as 
the methodology of the strike clearly indicates. Portland Wobblies sought to 
raise a common consciousness among these women, inspire protest, and offer 
organization. It would be simplistic to assume these actions were not replicated 
elsewhere, and that because failure tended to mark them they were not in 
earnest. It is similarly unhelpful to ignore the interconnectedness of 
organization drives and civil liberties struggles in Wobbly conflict. Even after 
the intensity of the conflict had subsided, Rudolph Schwab, a paid I.WW 
organizer, was arrested while promoting Portland's newly formed Free Speech 
League. San Diego did not spur an abandonment of the 'free speech' tactic, or 
of coalition forming to obtain that end. However, the significance of that 
conflict for western Wobblies and Progressives should not be diminished. 
During the Portland struggle, the specter of San Diego loomed large. When the 
East Side Businessmen's Club approached the Mayor on July 8 for help in 
suppressing the strike, the Oregonian warned that interference might "stir up a 
hornet's nest like that which played havoc in San Diego recently." Whenever 
Wobblies threatened to flood the city with agitators and fill the jails, and 
whenever local authorities broke up street meetings and engaged in 'vagging,' 
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the events of the previous year in San Diego seem to have functioned as a 
warning from each side to the other.11 
Much of the language used by members of the strike coalition did 
concentrate on aggressive invasion, and more than a few of the strike leaders 
were immigrants. The mainstream press concentrated heavily on these aspects 
of the strike. Tom Bums (English), Mary Schwab (Russian), and Henry Schoen 
(German) were all suspected of being in the country illegally. John Higham has 
found that Germans were one of three immigrant groups that dominated trade 
union leadership at the tum of the century, and although German-Americans 
comprised only 3.6% of Portland's population, the percentage of arrestees 
during the strike with German names was much higher. It is important to 
establish that antagonism toward these individuals did not arise from fear of 
immigrants, for over 40% of Portlanders in 1910 were foreign born or had 
immigrant parents. The idea of Wobblies and their sympathizers as invaders 
was much more important than the idea of them as foreign. During the conflict, 
ethnicity was only stressed in press reports when citizenship status was 
suspect. A perceived categorical rejection of American institutions and 
associated customs was much more important in engendering opposition to the 
Wobblies and their cohorts in prewar western towns than ethnic status.12 
Whether this rejection of cultural values among western laboring 
11News, June 28, 1913, p. 1; Fred Vollemen, letter to J.M. Matchek, July 13, 1913, MSC, 
SPARC; Oregonian, July 28, 1913, p. 7; July 9, 1913, p. 10. 
12Qregonian, July 19, 1913, p. 4; Journal, July 15, 1913, p. 2; July 16, 1913, p. 1; John 
Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984) 24; Stephen T. Janik, "Prosperity and the Pursuit of Order: Portland, 
Oregon during the Progressive Era, 1900-1913," B.A. (Hon.) thesis, Harvard College, 1969, 22-23; 
Paul G. Merriam, "The 'Other Portland': A Statistical Note on Foreign Born, 1860-1910" Oregon 
Historical Quarterly 80 (Fall 1979) 265. 
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communities was real or manufactured, however, remains unclear. Dubofsky 
claimed that Wobbly opposition to capitalist values, symbols, and institutions 
was the organization's binding force. Yet Conlin found the union adept at 
compromise with municipal authorities, which surely would have required 
some degree of shared cultural framework with their opponents. The Portland 
conflict does indicate that there was a great deal of ambivalence among the 
strike coalition concerning rejection of outside intervention and espousal of 
extreme methods. Just after the peak of the free speech conflict, Dr. Marie Equi 
told the press that she ''had hopes of getting a settlement but Burns and the 
authorities mixed too often." Burns had denounced the interference of the 
Industrial Welfare Commission, although the Journal reported that a group of 
strikers had requested their assistance. Yet he still led a group of women to the 
Mayor's office seeking help and assented to the conference proposed by the 
Governor. There is also evidence of protest by the strikers against the harangue 
launched by Equi during the latter attempt at compromise. The radical strike 
leaders, thus, were capable of shifting between antagonism and compromise 
rather easily.13 
The leaders were also guided by disparate motivations and ideological 
fluidity. Prior to the strike, Equi was what Burns would have called a 'parlor 
reformer' and was mainly concerned with mainstream Progressive issues, 
although she did have a reputation for pursuing them aggressively. On the very 
day the Oregon Packing Company strike began, Equi, in her capacity as 
13Dubofsky, 148-151; Joseph Robert Conlin, Bread and Roses Too: Studies of the 
Wobblies (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1969) 74-76; journal, July 19, 1913, p. 5; News, 
July 4, 1913, p. l; journal, June 30, 1913, p. 2; July 8, 1913, p. 15; July 11, 1913, p. 1; July 12, 1913, 
p.2. 
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President of the Eight-Hour League, sent a letter of thanks to Mayor Albee for 
his contribution to the cause. Ironically, she sent "very best wishes for the 
success of your future work." It seems likely the irony was also apparent to 
Albee, for the letter was stamped received on July 12, by which time Equi had 
launched many epithets toward his administration most contradictory to the 
sentiments included in her letter. The Journal reported, after her arrest, that 
"friends of Dr. Equi are at a loss to account for the stand she has taken in regard 
to the Industrial Workers of the World and the strike on the east side." Nancy 
Krieger has asserted that "the events of the cannery strike fundamentally 
altered Equi's life. The strike radicalized Equi through exposing her to both 
police brutality and to the weaknesses of the politics of the Progressive Party." 
Equi did state, almost a year after the strike, that the Oregon Packing Company 
conflict had turned her away from the political process and led her to believe 
only in 'direct action.'14 
It should not be forgotten that the attachment of the striking women to 
the radical organizations and individuals assisting them was recent, formed for 
utilitarian reasons, and seemed to have only rudimentary formality. After most 
of their leaders were in jail, the strikers attempted to hold a street meeting 
without them on July 17 and seemed to have been followed by Dr. Equi, who 
was assumed to have led them. She told the press several days later that she 
had "advised the girls not to attempt to speak on the street the other night, but 
they would do it, so I went along." Yet, the Mayor had claimed that "the 
14News, July 4, 1913, p. 1; Nancy Krieger, "Queen of the Bolsheviks: The Hidden 
History of Dr. Marie Equi" Radical America 17.5 (1983) 58; Marie Equi, letter to H.R. Albee, June 
28, 1913, MSC, SPARC; Journal, July 19, 1913, p. 5; Krieger, 60. 
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agitators ... persuaded some women strikers to appear at Sixth and Washington 
Streets." His attribution of responsibility for the meeting to radical leaders 
rather than women strikers is unsurprising. Ardis Cameron has asserted that 
local Progressives and Wobbly leaders alike, during the 1912 textiles walkout in 
Lawrence, Massachusetts, "refused to see women as active participants in the 
strike." A striker killed during a street meeting was held up by both factions as 
a "symbol for the victimization of the city's laboring women." Yet her work has 
uncovered a pivotal role for striking women independent of trade unions. 
"'Unorganized' by formal institutions, the threads of everyday life reinforced a 
sense of commonality among disparate members of the community, providing 
an effective counterweight to dissent organized from above." As Vincent 
DiGirolamo also discovered in his research on the women who participated in 
the Wheatland, California hoppickers strike, solidarity from shared experience 
as women and workers proved to be a more effective binding force than strict 
ethnic or ideological loyalties. ls 
Yet Ann Schofield has asserted that the events and language of the 
Lawrence struggle also indicate that "inclusion of women in the One Big Union, 
at least during a major labor confrontation," was genuine. "The Wobblies 
acknowledged that women had unique problems and they responded with 
special organizers." Schofield indicated that the IWW was preoccupied with 
prostitution, but always faulted capitalism and never the prostitute. Her 
15Joumal, July 19, 1913, p. 5; H.R. Albee, letter to Clarence L. Reames, September 19, 
1913, MSC, SP ARC; Ardis Cameron, Radicals of the Worst Sort: Laboring Women in Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, 1860-1912 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993) 176, 140; Vincent 
DiGirolamo, "The Women of Wheatland: Female Consciousness and the 1913 Wheatland Hop 
Strike" Labor History 34(Spring1993). 
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research showed that Wobbly cartoons and literature on the subject stressed the 
need for solidarity between the hobo and the prostitute, both victims of a 
ruthless capitalist society. This view of economic oppression as the major causal 
factor of contemporary prostitution stood in stark contrast to that of Father 
O'Hara, Chairman of the Industrial Welfare Commission of Oregon. O'Hara 
refused to use the specter of prostitution to rally support for the minimum 
wage movement, condemning such a tactic as insulting to the women he sought 
to uplift. Yet evidence of the strike coalition's reliance on this tactic to achieve 
their economic aims is rife during the Portland conflict. Equally clear is the high 
degree of antagonism it aroused among municipal authorities. Mary Schwab 
was alleged to have called a cannery worker who refused to join the strike a 
'white slaver,' and although a conviction was not obtained, her trial for use of 
abusive language was the most publicized of the conflict. From the beginning of 
the strike signs appeared linking low wages to prostitution. Several days into 
the walkout, a striker was seen carrying a sign reading "forty cents a day is 
what makes prostitutes, girls demand a living wage." A speaker collecting 
money to build a strike fund proclaimed that "many of these girls and women 
are self-supporting, and such conditions make for white slavery." When the 
strikers descended upon the Mayor's office on July 8, one carried a sign that 
read "to Hell with White Slavery and $6 per week." The Mayor objected, and 
later told the press that "signs such as this are certainly not decent and will not 
be permitted."16 
16Ann Schofield, "Rebel Girls and Union Maids: The Woman Question in the Journals 
of the AFL and IWW, 1905-1920" Feminist Studies 9 (Summer 1983) 348-350; Edwin V. O'Hara, A 
Living Wage by Legislation: The Oregon Experience (Salem, OR: State Printing Dept., 1916) xix-
xx; Oregonian, July 17, 1913, p. 12; Journal, June 30, 1913, p. 2; July 11, 1913, p. 1. 
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Although there seems to have been coalition-wide consensus on this 
issue, the absence among strikers of radical ideology either on banners or in 
reported speech reveals the extent of their independence from the radical 
organizations and individuals that assisted and organized their strike effort. 
Signs such as: "don't be a scab, we will feed and take care of you," and "we are 
your friends, let us help you" were typical of those that were used during the 
conflict. They indicate a solidarity built on trust through common experience, 
not ideology. Although Mary Schwab claimed that "we have made a Socialist 
out of every policeman on duty over there," there seems to be little evidence 
that they had even made socialists of the strikers. The ideological independence 
of the strikers, and the radicals' tolerance of it is highly significant in 
establishing the fluidity of power relationships within the coalition. That the 
ideological radicals themselves often wavered between compromise and 
intransigence and evinced disparate motivations further muddies any analysis 
of the binding force within the group.17 
There is no indication that the striking women rejected American 
institutions or community standards of morality and it is also unclear if the 
radical strike leaders consistently did so. Thomas Cooley was arrested on the 
evening of July 15 for supposedly "making disrespectful statements of ... 
organized government," clearly implying anarchic sympathies. However, 
Cooley claimed in court "that he meant no disrespect, merely making a remark 
that a laboring man has no rights." Henry Schoen, also arrested that evening, 
was "closely questioned" by Judge Stevenson to see "if he believed in direct 
17News, June 28, 1913, p. l; July 21, 1913, p. 4; Oregonian, July 13, 1913, p. 2. 
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action, or violence." He denied espousing these ideas. Tom Burns was also 
accused of making anarchic and violent statements that evening, though the 
comments attributed to him by the Oregonian were assigned to Ramsley by the 
Journal and the utterance of any such statements was denied by the News and 
their manufacture blamed on the necessity for the authorities to excuse 
otherwise unjustifiable arrests.18 
If Wobblies and their allies were neither adept at compromise with 
authority or unanimous in their opposition to it, the question of what did bind 
them together must arise. In the Portland conflict, agreement concerning the 
clearly oppressive nature of Oregon Packing Company conditions and work 
environments at other industrial establishments employing women was the 
only major cohesive influence. However, some sort of common cultural 
language was needed to ensure the agreement of all activists and strikers that 
the brand of reform currently championed by the state through the Industrial 
Welfare Commission, if proven inadequate, should be superseded. The 
immediate need to alleviate the misery of women in industrial life and 
eliminate expoititave prostitution resulting from it seems unquestioned by all 
members of the coalition. They communicated this understanding through a 
radical 'sensibility,' an extension of Salerno's notion of a Wobbly 'sensibility' 
that "gave passage to the social networks that defined its community" but was 
not predicated on a particular ideology. In order for the coalition to survive, all 
strikers and organizers would have had to agree that traditional methods of 
lB]ournal, July 16, 1913, p. 1; Oregonian, July 16, 1913, p. 1; Journal, July 16, 1913, p. 7; 
News, July 16, 1913, p. 1. 
industrial conflict resolution needed to be disregarded in at least some 
circumstances and possibly replaced with alternatives antithetical to 
Progressive cultural norms. Without this implicit understanding, or radical 
'sensibility,' the coalition could not have survived without disintegrating into 
factionalism.19 
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Syntheses of Wobbly conflicts have failed to examine them as the 
product of a cultural conflict between two differing 'sensibilities,' radical and 
Progressive. Significantly, scholars who admire the Wobblies and deplore their 
opponents often ignore the simple truth that the union's core constituency, 
migrant labor, was unwanted in well-established western cities. These workers 
were considered a constant nuisance, and feared as unruly and alien. Migrants 
were viewed by many urban residents as a corrupt and potentially violent 
presence in the city, and most importantly, one that had no real attachment to 
the community. Yet, they were not 'criminalized' by the implausible 'municipal 
government-regional industry' conspiracy suggested by Hoffman and Webb. 
These authors claimed that "the enforcement of vagrancy laws served to protect 
the interests of powerful social classes and institutions." In similar fashion, 
Francis Piven and Richard Cloward have suggested that municipal action 
19Salvatore Salerno, Red November, Black November: Culture and Community in the 
Industrial Workers of the World (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989) 147, 149. 
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toward the poor was intended to "influence unemployed persons to offer 
themselves to any employer on any terms." These assertions imply that public 
opinion in a city was meaningless. Supposedly, the police were henchmen of 
businessmen and politicians, who worked closely together to uphold a class-
based power structure with which they all explicitly agreed. While the public 
stared blindly at the poverty and strife around them, a 'ruling class' alone 
determined how unemployed migrants were to be treated.20 
This synthesis is obviously flawed. During the economic crisis of 
1913-14, some of the unemployed of Portland and Seattle were organized by the 
I.WW and mounted dramatic disturbances to have their claims recognized. 
Instead of systemic repression, police reaction may have been representative of 
a community consensus that viewed the I.WW unemployed as foreigners to 
their city, seeking a handout and representing a dangerous and unpredictable 
element. Predictably, Hoffman and Webb's Marxist thesis ignored the local 
population, and the extent of its shared values. Instead, these scholars focused 
on Portland and Seattle as microcosms of a larger two-class systemic struggle. 
More plausibly, John Townsend's explication of responses to Wobbly agitation 
suggested that the struggles that set Wobblies against municipal authorities 
were indeed systemic, but represented a battle between two increasingly 
marginal groups fighting cultural irrelevance more than each other.21 
Townsend's thesis inevitably raises the question of why two increasingly 
20'fownsend, 202-203; Dennis E. Hoffman and Vincent J. Webb, "Police Response to 
Labor Radicalism in Portland and Seattle, 1913-19," Oregon Historical Quarterly 87 (Winter 1986) 
356-357, 365, 356. 
21Hoffman and Webb, 345, 348-349; Townsend, 203-206. 
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marginal groups struggled openly and bitterly against each other, while often 
tolerating the very economic forces that were marginalizing them. The 
Wobblies were not, as Hoffman and Webb would claim, a legitimate threat to 
industrial capitalism and American republicanism. Townsend uncovered the 
cultural roots of anti-IWW anger, asserting that the Wobblies rhetorically 
attacked both psychic and social stability among the urban middle-classes. 
During a time of great economic upheaval for small business, Wobblies 
attacked the work ethic and its psychological value in American middle-class 
mythology as the source of property ownership, which in turn brought the 
individual social respectability and provincial power. These assualts 
approximated taunts that which suggested the emerging reality formed by 
rising corporate hegemony. But corporations were distant and intangible, and 
also paid lip service to traditional American cultural values. Thus, Wobblies 
were a present and antagonistic outlet for the systemically inspired anger of 
local Progressives.22 
Townsend's analysis reveals the weakness of too great an emphasis on 
economic factors and the arbitrary separation of working and middle-class 
cultural values. Although the AFL was empowering some workers, 
Progressivism in Portland was a vehicle for substantial segments of both the 
middle and working-class to reign in corporate transformation of the economy. 
Laborers used the same language as businessmen to reject the IWW. 
Consequently, the importance of rhetoric in understanding the inter-class 
nature of anti-Wobbly activity cannot be underestimated. Referring to 
22Townsend, 10, 194. 
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Wobblies as "alien invaders," these individuals believed themselves to be 
protectors of their cities. Perhaps, as Townsend suggested, this was the 
expression of a growing fear that small business was no longer empowered to 
pursue economic and cultural life in its own way. For although the T.WW were 
not in danger of overthrowing municipal authority and capturing private 
property, its rhetoric expressed the hope of doing just that and was an open 
insult to the cultural values and longing for order of individuals who were 
being marginalized by the development of a sophisticated national economy.23 
Townsend could have extended his thesis to include mainstream labor as 
well. Robert Johnston has suggested that the recent conception of a white-collar 
middle class was not the predominant notion in the early twentieth century. He 
has pointed to a contemporary notion of "the middle class as an inclusive and 
egalitarian group of small producers" as opposed to their more recently viewed 
historiographical place "in the 'middle' between capital and labor." This idea 
has strong logical appeal, for in 1910, only 7% of Portland's work force could be 
designated as professional, "a rough proxy'' for the supposedly burgeoning 
white-collar middle-class. Oearly, ideas of class identity were in flux during 
this period of rapid economic growth and social change. Herbert Gutman 
pointed out in his research on late nineteenth century Paterson, New Jersey that 
''because a grocer owned his business and a mayor presided over a bank, it 
does not mean they sympathized with the social policies of a large factory 
owner." Thus, the concept of cultural conflict must be added to that of middle-
class economic anxiety to fully explain the virtual unanimity of entire 
23Townsend, 194. 
communities in opposition to the cultural paradigm of the IWW.24 
Townsend's description of the typical process of anti-IWW coalition 
116 
forming supports this notion. By dehumanizing Wobblies through drastic 
language, the 'respectable element' of the local citizenry encouraged each other 
to actually treat Wobblies as less than human. However, this 'element' was not 
a social or economic elite. It included all individuals who shared much of a set 
of values sometimes designated in contemporary language as 'Americanism.' 
Townsend conceded that "in order to act against the IWW, it was necessary to 
involve as many people in a town as possible," and "the press was the agency 
most responsible for provoking the public attitude toward Wobblies." The 
Coos County deportations during the summer of 1913 provide an example of 
the anger of an entire community aroused by lengthy press campaigns 
threatening Wobbly unrest. The expression of shared values, to which it was 
asserted that the IWW was in firm opposition, roused the citizenry to repel the 
"savage invaders." Unable to respond to press attacks in kind, the IWW usually 
became, in the words of Ralph Chaplin, "intolerably explosive. We wanted to 
shout labor's sufferings from the housetops." Inevitably, where the IWW was 
able to muster supporters, the violent confrontations known as 'free speech 
fights' would ensue.25 
Joseph Conlin claimed that the Wobblies were "vividly aware of the 
value of public opinion" and often tried to communicate peacefully with the 
public. Yet, their open rejection of' Americanism' was in itself hostile and 
24Johnston, 33, 77-78, 122. 
25Townsend, 194-196; William G. Robbins, Hard Times in Paradise: Coos Bay, Oregon, 
1850-1986 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988) 141-142; Townsend, 197. 
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would obviously preclude constructive communication. The IWW demanded 
that individuals abandon the national cultural paradigm and adopt a 
completely new one. Only this conversion process could make their rhetoric 
constructively communicative. The Wobblies were perceived to be a social 
movement, not the misrepresented conventional union that Conlin portrays. 
Aileen Kraditor asserted that "in a period of great uncertainty in industrial 
relations" people who heard a radical labor leader utter violent words thought 
that their followers might well act on them. But it was not real fear of 
revolution, and certainly not of trade unionism, that caused frequent instances 
of anti-Wobbly violence. Local authorities or vigilantes viewed their own 
aggressive actions as preemptive of Wobbly violence. Surely, IWW rhetoric led 
many to believe that they were indeed a violent organization. The Progressive 
fear of disorder led not so much to the suppression of radical doctrines (the 
Wobblies retained mailing privileges), but of individuals who associated 
themselves personally with violent rhetoric. Kraditor found that "those who 
called for repression of socialists did so out of fear of 'anarchist' violence and 
not out of a desire to suppress radical propaganda per se." Thus, although 
Conlin asserted that anti-Wobbly violence was an attack on unionism, it was 
actually something quite different. The AFL survived because it eschewed 
violence, cooperated with authority, and actively combatted radicalism. Its 
acceptance of the framework of capitalism made its desire for peaceful reform 
societally acceptable. Kraditor asserted that "'violent' and 'anarchist' were 
labels guaranteed to ostracize any person or group wearing them." The actions 
of the IWW mattered little once they brought these descriptors upon themselves 
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by using anti-social rhetoric.26 
The threat of the T.WW was, as Townsend asserted, both psychic and 
social. Wobblies openly denigrated values upon which the identities of those 
they sought to antagonize were founded. These values were simultaneously 
being attacked, in a much more substantial fashion, by the growth of a national 
corporate economy. The sense of upheaval experienced by the opponents of the 
Wobblies often led to some degree of sympathy for the Progressive movement, 
which sought to restore a feeling of order to its constituency. The T.WW openly 
flouted the goals of this movement rhetorically, and with physical disturbances 
wherever it was active. They were actively opposed not as a viable challenge to 
industrial capitalism, but as an organization hostile to the cultural 
understanding between western Progressives which served as a framework for 
negotiation to prevent the dominance of corporate power.27 
26Ai1een S. Kraditor, The Radical Persuasion, 1890-1917: Aspects of the Intellectual 
History and Historiography of Three American Radical Organizations (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1981) 96-102. 
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